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Abstract
This thesis argues that Antisthenes and his  Ajax  and  Odysseus have been neglected and 
misunderstood.   The  texts  have  been  translated  for  this  study,  and  as  there  has  not 
previously been a complete, continuous translation of them in any language, they have been 
appended  to  the  front  of  the  paper.   On  rare  occasions  when  Antisthenes  has  been 
considered  by  modern  scholars  he  has  either  been  dismissed  as  a  minor  rhetorician  or 
thought of as the founder of Cynicism.  It will be argued here that he was neither.  In a 
similar vein, his only extant works, the Ajax and Odysseus, have been generally thought of as 
epideictic  display speeches  or  as  an expression  of  his  Cynic  outlook.   Chapter  one  will 
introduce Antisthenes and demonstrate that the speeches are not epideictic.  Chapter two 
will consider characterisation and assess whether the Ajax and Odysseus could be examples 
of ethopoiia.   Chapter three will  then situate these speeches in the broader fifth century 
literary and cultural  context  in order to  understand the extent of  their  contribution to a 
wider symbolic discourse.  Chapter four will demonstrate that Antisthenes' philosophy was 
not driven by a proto-Cynic agenda but rather by quite distinct ethical concerns.
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ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ1
[1.1] Ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἵπερ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρῆσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει
σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ
μὲν παραγενόμενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἄπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ
[1.5] οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν
μὴ εἰδότων γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα
ἐγίγνετο ἔργῳ. 
[2.1] τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως
ἐκόμισα ἐγὼ φέρων, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ὅδε, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι οὐ
τῶν ὅπλων μᾶλλον ἐπεθύμουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ
κρατῆσαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ᾐκίσαντό τε ἂν
[2.5] τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἕκτορος ἐκομίσαντο· τὰ
δὲ ὅπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ' ἀπέ-
κρυψαν,
[3.1] δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ὃς καὶ
πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ
νύκτωρ ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς. κἀγὼ μὲν ἀξιῶ λαβεῖν ἵν' ἀποδῶ τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς
[3.5] φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἵν' ἀποδῶται, ἐπεὶ χρῆσθαί γε αὐτοῖς
οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε· δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήμοις ὅπλοις
χρήσαιτο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὅπλα.
[1.1] I wish I was being tried by the very people who were there with us 
during this venture.  For I know that while I would only need 
to be silent, nothing would be gained by this man by arguing.  But as it is, those
who were there during these deeds are absent, and you 
[1.5] ignorant men are judging me.  What sort of justice could one receive
from judges who are ignorant? And by arguments at that! But the endeavour 
came about via action.
[2.1] While I picked up and carried the body
of Achilles, this man took the arms, knowing that 
the Trojans were not more eager about the arms, but rather to gain control
of the body.  For if they had gained control of it, they would have ravaged
[2.5] his body and gained requital for Hector.  But the 
arms, these they would not have dedicated to their gods, but would have | hidden them away
[3.1] out of fear of this “brave” man, who had also
previously robbed their temple of the statue of the goddess
by night, and as if he were carrying out some noble deed he displayed it
to the Achaeans.  And I indeed I think I deserve to receive them, so that I can restore
[3.5] the arms to his friends.  But this man, so that he can sell them, since he surely would not 
dare to use them.  For no coward uses conspicuous 
arms – he knows that the arms make his cowardice obvious.
1 Found in MS Palatinus (Bekker X) and its relatives.
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[4.1] σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἅπαντα ὅμοια. οἵ τε γὰρ διαθέν-
τες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνειν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις, οἵ τε οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάσειν
ὑπισχνεῖσθε περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴστε. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπίσταμαι τοῦτο, 
[4.5] ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἱκανὸς ὢν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν
ἐπιτρέψειεν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἤπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰατρὸς διαγνῶναι
νοσήματα ἄλλῳ παρείη. 
[5.1] καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοιότροπον, οὐδ' ἂν
ἡττᾶσθαί μοι διέφερε· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει πλέον
ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε. ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν δράσειε2
φανερῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρᾳ τολμήσαιμι πρᾶξαι.
[5.5] κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων, οὐδὲ γὰρ
κακῶς πάσχων, ὃ δὲ κἂν κρεμάμενος,3 εἰ κερδαίνειν τι
μέλλοι·
[6.1] ὅστις γε μαστιγοῦν παρεῖχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ
τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγμαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον, κἄπειτα
περιβαλόμενος ῥάκη, τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδὺς τῶν
πολεμίων, ἱεροσυλήσας ἀπῆλθε. καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογήσει
[6.5] ποιεῖν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πείσει, λέγων ὡς καλῶς πέπρακται.
[4.1] So it is more or less the same all over.  For those men who arranged
the contest, though they claim to be kings, entrusted 
the judgement of excellence to others, and you who are ignorant have undertaken
to judge a matter about which you have no clue.  But I know this:
[4.5] that no king competent to judge about excellence 
would entrust this to others any more than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis
of illnesses by another.
[5.1] And if I were opposed to a man of similar character to myself, being defeated
would not matter to me.  But as it is, nothing could be more different 
than me and him.  For while there is no exploit he would do
openly, I would not dare to do anything surreptitiously.
[5.5] And whereas I could not bear a cowardly reputation, nor
to be mistreated, he would endure being strung up for flogging if he could derive any profit
by it.
[6.1] He who in fact did submit himself to being flogged by slaves, and
being beaten with rods on the back, and punched with fists in the face, and then
having thrown rags about himself, by night he crept inside the walls of the
enemy, and having committed temple-robbery, he came back.  And this he will admit
[6.5] to doing.  And perhaps he will be persuasive – arguing that it is a splendid achievement.
2 LSJ δράω (s.v) 'do, accomplish, esp. do some great thing, good or bad.'
3 LSJ κρεμάννυμι (s.v.) 'II. Pass., to be hung up, suspended'; i.e. here, as is evident from the subsequent 
passage, 'hung up for flogging'.
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ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων ὅδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερό-
συλος ἀξιοῖ κρατῆσαι;  
[7.1] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς
καὶ δικασταῖς, μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνοντας, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ
λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ' ἔργῳ· οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς
[7.5] πολεμίους, ἀλλ' ἢ μαχομένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ.
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθρεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὡς, εἰ μὴ δικάσετε
καλῶς, γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον
ἰσχύν, 
[8.1] οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑμᾶς ὅ τι λέγων ἀνὴρ ὠφελήσει,
εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δι' ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ
μακροὶ λόγοι4 λέγονται. ἀλλ' ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε
τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς. καὶ ταῦ-
[8.5] τα μὴ κρύβδην φέρετε, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς, ἵνα γνῶτε ὅτι
καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάζουσι δοτέα δίκη ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ δικάσω-
σιν ὀρθῶς. κἄπειτ' ἴσως γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν
λεγομένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ5 κάθησθε.
And then this man – who has been flogged and is a temple-robber – thinks he deserves to gain 
possession of the arms of Achilles? 
[7.1] On the contrary, I enjoin you ignorant men – judges
and jurymen – not to consider arguments when you are deciding 
about excellence, but rather to consider deeds.  For indeed war is not 
decided by argument but by action.  It is not possible to gainsay the 
[7.5] enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved – in silence.
Look at and consider this!  That unless you judge
well, you will come to realise that argument has no power in comparison | with action;
[8.1] and nor is there any way an arguing man will aid you,
but you will know to a nicety that because of a dearth of deeds, many and 
long arguments are argued.  But either admit that you do not understand
the arguments made, and adjourn;6  or judge correctly!  And do this
[8.5] not secretly, but openly!  So that you may realise that 
there is a penalty that must be paid by the judges themselves, if they do not judge
correctly.  And then perhaps you will also recognise that you are seated here not 
as judges over the arguments but merely as guessers.
4 μακρὸς λόγος: Denyer (2008, 121, n.329b2) says, 'was used in particular for the rambling and incoherent 
rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. IA 313 'slave that you are, you're telling me 
μακροὺς … λόγους'; Arist. Met. 1091a7-9 'ὁ μακρὸς λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing 
wholesome to say'; Simonides (fr. 653 PMG) may have written a whole book of such speeches'.
5 δοξαστής: LSJ (s.v.) 'one who forms opinions or conjectures, opp. κριτής'.
cf. δόξα: LSJ (s.v.) 'A.II.2. mere opinion, conjecture, δόξῃ ἐπίστασθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι, imagine, suppose (wrongly), 
Hdt.8.132, Th.5.105; “δόξης ἁμαρτία” Id.1.32; δόξαι joined with φαντασίαι, Pl.Tht.161e, cf. 
Arist.Ph.254a29 … speaking by guess, Isoc.8.8, cf. 13.8'. Emphasis mine.
6 cf. Dem. 21.221 αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀναστῇ τὸ δικαστήριον as soon as this court rises, i.e. adjourns.
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[9.1] ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν μὲν ὑμῖν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτρέπω, διαδο-
ξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρός,
ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ' ἄκων ἀφῖκται εἰς Τροίαν, καὶ περὶ
[9.5] ἐμοῦ ὃς πρῶτος ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγμαι.
[9.1] But while I rely upon you to make determination about me and my affairs, 
I forbid you in all areas from making guesses, and this matter is about a man,
who not willingly but rather unwillingly came to Troy, and about
[9.5] me, who am always stationed first, and alone, and without walls.
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ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ
[1.1] οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος, δι' ὃν ἀνέστην,7 ἀλλὰ
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας· πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα
τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζῶντος
ἂν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ νῦν τεθνεῶτος λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς.
[1.5] ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην μεμάχησθε, ἣν
οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς
ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ξύνοιδε.
[2.1] καίτοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς μάχαις,
οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ
τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις, οὓς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνευον, εἰ
μὲν κατορθώσαιμι, ἅπαντα ὑμῖν ἐπετελεῖτο, ὧν ἕνεκα
[2.5] δεῦρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ' ἐσφάλην, ἐμοῦ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς
ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα μαχοίμεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ'
ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα τήν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιμεν καὶ τὴν
Τροίαν ἕλοιμεν.
[3.1] ταῦτα δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις
ἐνῆν ἅπαντα. ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεχρημένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι
τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιμεν
τὸ κλαπὲν παρ' ἡμῶν,8 τίς ἐστιν ὁ κομίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλ-
[1.1] My argument – for which I rose to speak – is not to you alone, but 
also to all the others.  For I have done the army
greater good than all of you.  And these things, that I would have said to you even if 
Achilles were alive, I am saying to you now that he is dead.
[1.5] For you fought no battle, but those which
I also fought with you.  But none of you shares with me the knowledge of the risks
I took on my own.
[2.1] And indeed, in these shared battles,
not even if you had contended honourably, would any more have been achieved.  But in 
respect of my ventures – through which I alone hazarded the dangers – if in fact I have
executed them successfully, then all the goals for which we came to this place have been 
accomplished 
[2.5] for you, and if I had failed, you would have been deprived
of but one man.  For it was not to fight against the Trojans that we came
here, but to recover Helen and
capture Troy.
[3.1] And all these depended on my ventures.  
For example, when the oracle pronounced Troy 
impregnable unless we had first seized the statue of the goddess
by our subterfuge; who conveyed the statue here
7 ἀνίστημι: LSJ (s.v.) '1. stand up, rise, esp. to speak, “τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη” Il.1.68,101, etc.' 
8 cf. X.Cyr.5.5.13 τὸ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἀδίκημα done by me
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[3.5] μα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγώ; ὃν σύ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ
οὐδὲν οἶσθα, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ
ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν ὑφελόμενον9 παρ' ἡμῶν
Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον.
[4.1] καὶ τὴν Τροίαν
μὲν ἁλῶναι ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως
ἔσται τοῦτο, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἴπερ καλόν γε
ἦν ἑλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὑρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον.
[4.5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ἐμοί.
ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀμαθίας ὧν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα.
[5.1] κἀγὼ
μὲν οὐκ ὀνειδίζω σοι τὴν ἀμαθίαν – ἄκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ
σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πεπόνθασιν ἅπαντες – ἀλλ' ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὀνεί-
δη τὰ ἐμὰ σῳζόμενος οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
[5.5] καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τούσδε, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ
τὰ ὅπλα ψηφίσωνται. καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ
πολλά, πρὶν καὶ σμικρόν τι ἐργάσασθαι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐκ
τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκμαίρεσθαι,10 ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς
οἴομαί σε κακόν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι.
[3.5] other than I, the man whom you [Ajax] adjudge guilty of temple-robbery?  For you
are ignorant, you who call the man who recovered the
statue of the goddess 'temple-robber', 
but not Alexander who stole from us!
[4.1] And while every one of you 
is praying that Troy be captured, I, who discovered how
this will come to pass, you brand 'temple-robber'?  And yet if it was really noble
to capture Ilios, it was also noble to discover the means to do it.
[4.5] And while the others are grateful, you go so far as to reproach me.
For through stupidity you are ignorant of the benefits you have received.
[5.1] And I in fact am not reproaching you for your stupidity – for both you and 
all others who suffer this condition do so involuntarily – but rather, the fact that you are 
incapable of believing, due to the slanders which you brought against me, that you were saved 
by me.  And
[5.5] you are even threatening in addition that you will do some harm against these men, if they 
were to vote the arms to me.  And indeed you will threaten often and
much, before you will accomplish even the slightest thing.  But if one must
form a judgement from probability, I think that by your wicked rage
you will do some harm to your very self.
9 ὑφαιρέω LSJ (s.v.) 'II. 2. take away underhand, filch away;  purloin, steal; also Med., filch, purloin'.
10 τεκμαίρομαι: LSJ (s.v.) 'A. assign, ordain, esp. of the gods; II. after Hom. judge from signs; abs., form a  
judgement'.
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[6.1] καὶ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεμίους κακῶς ἐποίησα,
δειλίαν ὀνειδίζεις· σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερῶς ἐμόχθεις καὶ μάτην,
ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. <ἢ> ὅτι μετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἴει
βελτίων εἶναι; ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις; ὃς
[6.5] πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ' ὅπως ἔδει μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
ὗς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόμενος τάχ' ἄν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν
κακῷ περιπεσών τῳ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν
οὔθ' ὑφ' αὑτοῦ χρὴ οὔθ' ὑφ' ἑταίρου οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων
κακὸν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν;
[7.1] σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαί-
ρεις, ὅτι σέ φασιν οἵδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν
γε ἁπάντων τε καὶ δεδιότα τὸν θάνατον μάλιστα· ὅστις γε
πρῶτον ὅπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα [καὶ ἄτρωτα], δι' ἅπερ σέ
[7.5] φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι. καίτοι τί ἂν δράσεις, εἴ τις σοὶ
τῶν πολεμίων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἦ που κα-
λόν τι καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μηδέτερος ὑμῶν μηδὲν
δρᾶσαι δύναιτο. ἔπειτα οἴει τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὅπλα
ἔχων ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι; καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ δὴ τεῖχος
[7.10] οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς σὺ φῄς· μόνος μὲν οὖν σύ γε ἑπταβόειον
περιέρχῃ τεῖχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ·
[6.1] And so you rebuke me for cowardice because I have done
harm to the enemy.  But because you were toiling openly and in vain,
you were foolish.  Or is it because you have done this along with everyone, you think
you are better?  And then you speak to me about excellence? You who
[6.5] in the first place don't know even how you ought to fight, but just like
a wild pig is carried away by anger, perhaps one day you will kill yourself
when you fall upon something evil.  Do you not know that a brave warrior
should not suffer evil in any way whatsoever, not by his own hand, or his companion's 
nor even at the hands of his enemies?
[7.1] But do you delight just as children do, because these men 
say that you are brave?  But I say you are actually the greatest coward
of all and fear death exceedingly.   You who
firstly have arms that are indestructible, on account of which 
[7.5] they say that you are invulnerable.  And indeed what would you do, if one of your enemies 
were to approach you bearing such arms?  For surely
this would be something fine and marvellous, if neither of you
were able to do anything!  Secondly, do you think there is any difference between bearing such 
arms and being ensconced within a city-wall?  For you alone 
[7.10] there is no wall – so you say.  Yet in fact it is you alone who go around
with a seven-ox-hide wall wrapped around yourself.
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[8.1] ἐγὼ δὲ
ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτὰ
εἰσέρχομαι τὰ τείχη, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς προφύλακας
ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὅπλοισιν αἱρῶ, καὶ εἰμὶ στρατηγὸς
[8.5] καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τὰ
τ' ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐχὶ πέμπων κατασκε-
ψόμενον ἄλλον· ἀλλ' αὐτός, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν νύκτα
καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας,
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σῴζω.
[9.1] οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγησά-
μενος, ἐν ᾧ μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν·
οὐδ' εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαί μέ τινες ἔμελλον, γλιχόμενος11 ἂν τοῦ
δοκεῖν ἐτόλμων·12 ἀλλ' εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μα-
[9.5] στιγίας ὢν μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν, ἐπε-
χείρουν ἄν, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς ὁρῴη. οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεμος
ἀλλὰ δρᾶν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ
ὅπλα ἐστί μοι τεταγμένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλοῦμαι τοὺς
πολεμίους μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ
[9.10] πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἕτοιμός εἰμ' ἀεί.
[8.1] Whereas I go unarmed, not just up to the walls of the enemy, but inside the very
walls themselves.  And I overpowered the watchful sentries of the enemy
with their own weapons, and I am the general
[8.5] and protector of both you and all of the others, and I know what is going on 
here and among the enemy, and not because I send another 
spying; but I myself, just as helmsmen keep watch – through the night
and through the day, so that they save the sailors –
so I am the one who saves both you and all the others.
[9.1] And there is no danger that I shirked, because I thought it shameful, 
provided I could do some damage to the enemy.
And not even if some people were likely to witness me, would I have undertaken my ventures 
out of lust for a glorious reputation; but either as a slave, or as a beggar and knave,
[9.5] intending to do some harm to the enemy, I would
make my attempt, even if no one was watching.  For war does not lend itself to making
glorious displays, but to taking action continuously both by day and by night.
I have no prescribed armaments in which I challenge the
enemy to fight, but by whatever way anyone wants, and 
[9.10] against one or against many, I am always ready.
11 γλίχομαι: LSJ (s.v.) 'cling to, strive after, long for, τινός Hdt.3.72; ὡς στρατηγήσεις γλίχεαι how thou shalt 
become general, Hdt.7.161; +inf., ὧν ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἅψασθαι Th.8.15; εἰδέναι Pl.Grg. 489d'.
12 τολμάω: LSJ (s.v.) 'II. 2. sts. +part. ἐ. . . βαλλόμενος he submitted to be struck, Od.24.162'.
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[10.1] οὐδ' ἡνίκα
κάμνω μαχόμενος, ὥσπερ σύ, τὰ ὅπλα ἑτέροις παραδί-
δωμι, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέμιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς
τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεμαι, ἔχων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἃ ἐκείνους 
[10.5] βλάψει μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νὺξ πώποτέ με ἀφείλετο, ὥσπερ
σὲ πολλάκις μαχόμενον ἄσμενον πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ' ἡνίκα ἂν
ῥέγχῃς13 σύ, τηνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σῴζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους
ἀεὶ κακόν τι ποιῶ, ἔχων τὰ δουλοπρεπῆ ταῦτα ὅπλα καὶ
τὰ ῥάκη καὶ τὰς μάστιγας, δι' ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις. 
[11.1] σὺ δ' ὅτι φέρων ἐκόμισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρεῖος οἴει
εἶναι; ὃν εἰ μὴ ἠδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην,
κἄπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν ἠμφισβήτουν.
κἀμοὶ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν 
[11.5] ἔλεγες ἀμφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν
φροντίσαις, ἑνὸς δ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁμολογῶν δειλότερος | εἶναι; 
[12.1] οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ
τῶν ὅπλων ἔμελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν
ἔμελλον, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς
γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουμένοις αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
[12.5] μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσι θάπτειν. σὺ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἕτοιμα ἐκόμισας·
ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὀνειδιζόμενα ἀφειλόμην ἐκείνους.
[10.1] When I 
grow weary I do not, as you do, hand over my arms to another,
but whenever the enemy rests, then I attack them
in the night, bearing such armaments as will 
[10.5] harm them the most.  And nor has the night ever yet hindered me,
as it has many times readily stopped you fighting.  But when
you are snoring, at precisely that time I keep you safe; and ever 
doing some harm to the enemy – bearing these servile weapons, and
rags, and lash marks – during which you securely sleep.
[11.1] And did you think that picking up and carrying the body was
brave?  Which if you had not been able to pick up, two men would have picked up,
and then they would have perhaps been disputing with us over the prize of valour.
And I would have been delivering this very argument to them; and what would you
[11.5] be saying as you disputed against them?  Or would you have given no heed
to two, but feel shame to admit to being more cowardly than one?
[12.1] Are you ignorant that the body was of no concern to the Trojans
but it was the arms that they were eager to seize?  For they were going to give back 
the body, but the the arms they were going to dedicate at their temples to the gods.
For those failing to take up bodies don't have shame, but rather those do
[12.5] who don't give them up for burial.  So you carried away what was easy,
while I took from them the things which, by my seizing, brings them reproach.
13 ῥέγκω: LSJ (s.v.) 'A. snore; The form ῥέγχω occurs in Hp.Aph.6.51, Arist. ll. cc., Men.Mon.711, 
Orph.Fr.148'.
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[13.1] φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς, κακῶν ἐναντι-
ώτατα αὑτοῖς· καὶ ὃ μέν σε ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν,
ἣ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπινον μὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας· διότι
γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἴει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφίᾳ14 
[13.5] περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἰσχῦσαι;15 ἀμαθία
δὲ κακὸν μέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσιν.
[14.1] οἶμαι δ', ἐάν
ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητὴς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται, ἐμὲ
μὲν ποιήσει πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον
καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ μόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἑλόντα, σὲ δέ,
[14.5] ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις
καὶ βουσὶ τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσμεύειν καὶ
ζευγνύναι αὑτούς.
[13.1] You are suffering from envy and ignorance, the most antithetical of evils
to each other: the one makes you desire noble things,
the other turns you away from them.  So you are the victim of a particularly human frailty – for 
since you are strong, you suppose that you are also brave.  Are you ignorant that 
[13.5] cleverness and bravery in battle is not the same thing as being strong?  Stupidity
is the greatest evil to those who have it.
[14.1] But I believe, that if
there ever arises a poet who is shrewd concerning excellence, he will portray
me as much enduring, and much wily, and much scheming,
and a sacker of cities – the one who alone seized Troy.  But you,
[14.5] I believe, he will depict with a nature resembling that of lazy donkeys16
and grazing cattle – permitting others to chain and 
yoke them.
14 σοφία: Giannantoni. 
15 cf. Pi.Fr.61 τί ἔλπεαι σοφίαν ἔμμεν, ἃν ὀλίγον τοι | ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἰσχύει;  What do you imagine  
wisdom to be – that by which a man prevails slightly over a man?
16 cf. Il. 11.555ff
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Introduction
This study will aim to re-contextualise Antisthenes'  Ajax  and Odysseus.  The majority of 
scholarship carried out to date on these major extant fragments of this important literary 
figure have considered them to be philosophical texts.  This is the first serious consideration 
of them as literary artefacts with their place in the broader literary and cultural framework 
assessed and discussed.
In antiquity Antisthenes was considered to be among the three or four most important 
Socratic philosophers and in good company with writers such as Plato and Xenophon.  His 
reputation in modern scholarship, however, is almost non-existent.  This situation is just one 
of several anomalies regarding Antisthenes that this thesis will set out to address.  Generally 
considered  to  have  lived  from  about  445  to  366,  the  reported  tradition  relates  that 
Antisthenes  was  a  student  of  the  sophist  Gorgias  before  becoming  one  of  the  closest 
companions of Socrates.   Probably of noble birth, he certainly had the means to support 
himself so that he could spend all his time with Socrates.  Plato records that he was present  
at Socrates' death.  A prolific author, Antisthenes composed over 70 volumes of literary and 
philosophical works on a range of topics rivalled only by Aristotle and Democritus.  Apart 
from the Ajax and Odysseus, which seem to be complete, only fragments are now extant.
In the opinion of ancient scholars, Antisthenes was one of the best exponents of the pure  
Attic  style.   Ancient  critics  including  Cicero,  Panaetius,  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus, 
Phrynichus and Epictetus spoke favourably of his works and numbered him amongst the 
most influential writers of his day.  In particular he was regularly mentioned along with 
Plato and Xenophon as one of  the most important  Socratic  writers  and as  an author of  
Socratic dialogues.  Modern scholarship, in comparison, has virtually completely ignored 
Antisthenes.  Handbooks on oratory and rhetoric either mention him in a single line or fail to 
mention him at all.  The only scholarly monograph on Antisthenes ever published in English 
(Rankin, 1986) is titled Anthisthenes Sokratikos – the misspelling occurs on the cover, the spine, 
and the front page of the book.  In Oxford's 2007  Handbook to Greek Rhetoric, in a discussion 
of Hellenic oratory,  Vanderspoel credits Antisthenes with founding a school of rhetoric in 
Rhodes in the fourth century.  Given that Antisthenes died around 366 and the Hellenistic 
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period began in 323, Vanderspoel is probably getting Antisthenes of Athens confused with 
the historian Antisthenes of Rhodes who lived c. 200 BC.
The  only  complete  fragments  of  Antisthenes'  work  that  survive  are  two  speeches 
composed notionally on behalf of the epic heroes Ajax and Odysseus.  Each hero in turn  
offers reasons as to why he should receive the arms of Achilles or why his rival should not. 
Being composed at the close of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century they are instances 
of the earliest extant, non-historical prose.   They are, for example, as long as anything that  
survives from Gorgias.  In spite of this, these works of Antisthenes, who was as famous as 
Plato in antiquity, have been almost completely neglected.  Luis Navia published a second 
book in English on Antisthenes in 2001.  In the entire volume he mentions these complete 
works twice and does not discuss them.  It is not entirely surprising, however, that more 
people  are  not  studying  the  Ajax  and  Odysseus given  the  absence  of  any  complete, 
continuous translation of them in any language.  This probably makes Antisthenes the only 
major late fifth, early fourth century writer who has not been translated.  In so far as these 
works  have been noticed by scholars,  they have generally been considered epideictic  or 
display speeches,  that  is,  model  examples of  speeches presenting an ideal  version of  an 
argument guaranteed to sway the jury and win the case.
Chapter one will start off by summarising the surviving information about Antisthenes' 
life before moving on to survey the assessments of Antisthenes in antiquity, at which time he 
was much admired.  As already noted, Antisthenes has not enjoyed such a high reputation in 
modern times.   However,  to  the extent  that  he has been noticed the scholarship will  be 
examined.  The Ajax and Odysseus will be considered, with a view to deciding whether they 
fit the mould of 'epideictic' or 'display' speeches, as is most commonly claimed.  The findings 
will prove to be contrary to the consensus of modern scholarship.  
In  the second chapter the subject  of  ancient characterisation will  be discussed.   Close 
attention will  be  paid  to  Lysias,  as  he  is  credited with  developing  characterisation,  and 
especially ethopoiia, for ancient rhetoric.  The development of characterisation and ethopoiia 
in particular, was an exciting moment in literary history.  It demonstrated an interest and 
willingness on the part of ancient writers to try to understand the ethics and mindset that 
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motivated other people and then to represent them through appropriately devised texts. 
Though it might be imagined that the development of characterisation in prose writing was 
an  important  field  of  study for  ancient  literature,  there  is  very  little  scholarship  on  the 
subject.  Nevertheless, what there is will be surveyed and then the Ajax and Odysseus will be 
examined  in  the  light  of  these  findings  to  see  if  perhaps  Antisthenes  himself  was 
participating in or even stimulating the bold and original work on characterisation that was 
taking place in this period.
In chapter three the place of the  Ajax  and  Odysseus in the broader literary and cultural 
framework of the late fifth and early fourth century will be considered.  In epic Odysseus  
was always portrayed as an heroic figure. However, in the second quarter of the fifth century 
he  became  a  villain.   In  tragedy,  rhetoric,  philosophy  and  art,  Odysseus  came  to  be 
consistently characterised as a crafty word-smith who preyed on a series of guileless, noble 
Homeric  heroes  such  as  Ajax,  Achilles  and  Priam.   The  surviving  works  in  which  this 
characterisation of Odysseus and his noble victims is evident will be surveyed and then a 
series of symbolically opposed ethical values will be discussed.  Antisthenes' place in the 
wider context will  be kept in mind throughout.   Finally,  the broader fifth century socio-
historical background will be touched on.  
The last chapter will consider Antisthenes' own philosophical outlook and what can be 
ascertained about it from the Ajax and Odysseus, as well as from his other extant fragments 
(which number about 200).  Antisthenes has uniformly been considered to be a proto-Cynic 
whose  philosophy  is  therefore  generally  read  in  conformity  with  Cynic  views.   Those 
authors who have thought about it all agree that Odysseus, as represented in Antisthenes' 
speech,  is  the  winner  of  the  debate  with  Ajax,  and  is  also  some  sort  of  expression  of 
Antisthenes'  Cynic outlook.  These views will be closely scrutinised and challenged with 
extensive reference to the other extant fragments as well as to Plato's  Apology.  From this 
study a rather unorthodox, yet also unambiguous, view of Antisthenes' philosophical and 
ethical concerns will emerge that will new light on the texts and on Antisthenes himself.  
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Chapter 1 – Antisthenes; his Ajax and Odysseus.
Though  initially  reported  to  have  been  a  student  of  Gorgias,  Antisthenes  was  most 
influenced by Socrates.  He is said to have walked five miles every day to Athens from his  
home in Peiraeus to hear Socrates and he also advised his own followers to become students 
of  Socrates  (D.L.  6.1-2).   He seems to  have  been  a  constant  companion of  Socrates.   In 
Xenophon's Memorabilia he is presented as a primary interlocutor of Socrates; by his side and 
ready to answer questions at a moment's notice (2.5.1-3).  In the same work Socrates himself  
says that Antisthenes never leaves him (3.11.17).  He has an even more prominent role in 
Xenophon's Symposium, where he is portrayed as the most important person present next to 
Socrates.17  When Socrates asks him if he has a passion for anyone, he replies 'By the gods, I  
do have a passion, very much so: it's you!' (8.4).18  It is also reported that in Antisthenes' 
writings Socrates is the only person who retains his reputation as a good advisor, respectable 
teacher and so on (Ath. 5.220e).  Plato depicts him in the Phaedo as one the close friends of 
Socrates, present at the time of his death (59b).  Afterwards it is reported that  Antisthenes 
was  responsible  for  the  exile  of  Anytus  and  the  execution  of  Meletus,  the  accusers  at 
Socrates' trial (D.L. 6.8-9).  
In antiquity Antisthenes enjoyed a reputation for conversing and debating that was the 
equal of any of his contemporaries.  Of all the Socratics, Antisthenes alone was praised by 
Theopompus,  who  said  he  had  consummate  skill  and  could,  by  means  of  agreeable 
discourse, win over anyone he pleased (FGrH 115 F 295 = SSR 22.9ff).  Xenophon described 
him similarly  as  the  most  agreeable  of  men in  conversation  and the  most  temperate  in 
everything else  (D.L.  6.15 =  SSR 22.12f).   Antisthenes'  portrait  in Xenophon's  Symposium 
shows that it is he rather than Socrates who is the master of ἔλεγχος or 'cross-examination'. 
He rises to cross-examine any person who makes a statement he is dubious about, 19  and 
actually cross-examines Socrates himself at one point (2.10).20  Callias even makes a joke of 
17 Noted by Sayre 1948, 238; cf. Rankin 1986, 20.
18 Socrates (not normally a winner of beauty contests) teases Antisthenes in reply that it is only his good 
looks that he is infatuated with and not his soul (8.6).
19 e.g. Callias at 3.4 & again at 4.2-3, Niceratos at 3.6,  
20 To ask him why if, as Socrates says, women can be taught anything, he does not then teach his wife 
Xanthippe, 'the most difficult woman not just of this generation, but of all generations past and yet to 
come'.
24
this  tendency  and  muses  about  what  the  best  sort  of  music  would  be  to  accompany 
Antisthenes when he starts cross-examining one of the symposiasts.  Antisthenes suggests 
whistling (presumably derisive)21 (4.5). 
Antisthenes also had a prodigious literary output.  Diogenes Laertius lists more than 70 
titles, a quantity, and on a range of topics, rivalled only by Aristotle (46 works: D.L. 5.13) and 
Democritus (68 works: D.L. 9.13).  The titles cover topics including language, dialogue, and 
literature,  as  well  as  ethics  and  politics  (Prince  2006,  79).  Ancient  critics  considered 
Antisthenes to be a similar calibre of writer to contemporaries who are far better known 
today.  Phyrnichus, an admirer of style, rated Antisthenes as one of the finest exponents of 
the pure Attic style along with writers including Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides and Critias  
(SSR 50).  Dionysius of Halicarnassus classed Antisthenes as a Socratic writer along with 
Critias and Xenophon (Thuc. 51).  Epictetus commended the writings of Antisthenes for their 
excellent  style  and  discusses  them  in  conjunction  with  those  of  Plato  and  Xenophon 
(Discourses 2.17.36).  Lucian also mentions Antisthenes' writings in the same breath as those 
of  Plato (The Ignorant Book Collector 27;  The Parasite 43).  Fronto compares lesser authors 
unfavourably against the trio of Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes (Ambr. 392), and Julian 
discusses Xenophon, Antisthenes and Plato as all being users of myth in the discussion of 
ethical theory (Or. 7.215-7).  We also know that along with Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines, 
Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, the genuineness of which was attested by Panaetius 
(D.L. 2.64  = F 12622).  In fact, Theopompus of Chios claimed that a number of Plato's works 
were derived from prior dialogues of Antisthenes23 (FGrH 115, F 259 = Ath. 11.508c).  Because 
of the profound impact Socrates had on Antisthenes, Prince even suggests that it is unlikely 
that he would have allowed the circulation of any works – e.g. from a theoretical 'rhetorical'  
period as Gorgias' student – that did not reflect Socrates' influence (2006, 78-9).  If so, it could 
be assumed that any extant fragments of his works do incorporate his Socratic values.
In terms of Antisthenes' extant fragments, about 200 have been collected.  Of these, two 
appear  to  be  complete  works.   They  are  the  Ajax and  Odysseus,  two  speeches  crafted 
21 Conjectured by Bowen 1998, ad loc..
22 In M. Van Straaten. 1946. Panétius: fragments. Amsterdam.
23 Perhaps to be taken with a grain of salt – the title of Theopompus' work was Against Plato's School.
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notionally on behalf of the heroes, mounting arguments as to why they respectively deserve 
to be awarded the arms of Achilles.  These speeches appear to have passed almost unnoticed 
by most of scholarship.  An extensive search has not revealed that there has ever been a 
complete, continuous translation of them published in any language.24  
In so far as the speeches have been noticed, they are generally considered to be 'epideictic'  
or display speeches that present an ideal version of an argument.  Jebb in a footnote terms 
them  'ἐπιδείξεις of  the  same  class  as  the  speeches  for  and  against  Palamedes  ascribed 
respectively  to  Gorgias  and  Alcidimas'  (1907,  xlviii,  n.  1).  In  his  handbook,  Kennedy 
includes  them in  his  chapter  'Epideictic  Oratory'  (1963,  170-2).   Worman calls  them 'set 
speeches' (2002, 33 & 85), and elsewhere elaborates that they are 'speeches that were written 
for instruction in how to compose a persuasive speech.  They are thus rare examples of a 
mostly lost tradition of using mythohistorical  figures to hone rhetorical  technique'  (150).  
Sayre also terms them 'rhetorical' (1948, 237).  They have also been referred to recently as 
'playful speeches', and 'exemplary debates' (Fox 2007, 544).  Bearing these opinions in mind, 
it is worth commencing a discussion of the speeches by considering some examples of the 
'persuasive rhetoric' that the protagonists employ.  Of the two speeches, it is clear that Ajax's 
comes first because Odysseus attacks elements of his opponent's speech when he replies (e.g. 
Od. 3.6ff, 4.5, 5.5, 6.1, 6.4).
Ajax starts out in the first line by saying 'I wish I was being tried by the very people who 
were there with us during this venture.'  That is: I wish I had another jury and not you.  He 
then goes on to say 'you who are judging are ignorant – what sort of justice could one receive 
from judges who are ignorant?' (1.4f).  So really asking: who are you to be judging me?  You 
are so ignorant that you are incapable of delivering a just verdict.  He claims that the judges 
know nothing about 'excellence' (ἀρετή) and thus are incompetent to perform the task they 
have undertaken (4.3).  Further into his speech he addresses them as 'you ignorant judges' 
and orders them to only consider actions not arguments when making their judgement (7.1). 
He goes on to command them: 'say that you don't understand the arguments made', in other 
words: admit your ignorance! (8.3ff).  Finally he more or less orders: I forbid you to do what 
24 Rankin offered a reasonable translation paragraph by paragraph interspersed with comments;  Rankin 
1986, 152-73.
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juries do! (9.2).
Ajax does not stop at insulting the jury but, as he builds toward the conclusion of his case,  
he  actually  begins  to  issue  thinly  veiled  threats:   'This  is  what  you should look at  and 
consider: that unless you decide nobly, you will come to realise that argument has no power 
in comparison with action!' (7.6ff).  This rapidly develops into direct threats: 'judge correctly.  
And do this not secretly, but openly, 'so that you may realise' (ἵνα γνῶτε) that there is a 
penalty that must be paid by those who judge, if they do not judge correctly!' (8.4ff).  The 
purpose clause used here holds an implicit threat.
Worman suggests that Antisthenes is working in these speeches with 'ideas about how 
different styles ought to suit different character types to be persuasive' (2002, 33).  While 
Ajax is certainly not bland,  if  his  character was intended to be persuasive,  it  seems that 
Antisthenes  has  crafted  a  rather  stunning  failure.  Evidently,  Ajax  is  so  far  from  being 
concerned about winning the jury over that he actually repeatedly insults them and then 
goes on to issue commands and threats.  Thus it is clearly difficult to make a convincing 
argument that this is a model speech designed to persuade or sway the jury.  Consider in 
contrast the remarks that Palamedes made to the jury in the eponymous epideictic speech 
penned by Gorgias: 'a summary of a long speech is worthwhile when one is speaking to a 
jury of inferiors; but before the leaders of Greece it is uncalled-for, as is the exhortation to 
pay attention or to remember what is said' (DK 82 B11.37).  Ajax's attitude throughout the 
entire speech is a far cry from ever hitting a conciliatory note let alone approaching this sort  
of ingratiating tone.  Rather than adopt a mild and appeasing persona intended to engage 
and win over the jurors, in his best moments Ajax is terse and indignant; the rest of the time 
he is strident, righteous and insulting.  His character is obviously entirely unsuited to the 
courtroom, and thus to being used as a set piece epideictic.  So it seems rather difficult to 
sustain the argument that it is intended as an example of an ideal rhetorical display speech 
that is guaranteed to win the case.  
It could then perhaps be argued that Ajax is merely being set up as a foil for his opponent; 
a sort of straw man that Odysseus can display superior skills by demolishing.  If he were 
really to be an effective foil,  however, he should offer a very compelling and convincing 
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argument.  Thus the brilliance of Odysseus would be revealed by his ability to overcome 
such a sophisticated defence.  But Ajax's argument is not even a moderately good one for 
persuading the jurors, let alone a great one.  More than anything it is actually self-defeating. 
So this begs the question: what then is Antisthenes setting out to do with this speech?
There are further clues as to the purpose of the speech in other things Ajax says.  He 
regrets the fact that he cannot nobly refrain altogether from debasing himself by having to 
address  an  unworthy  jury  rather  than  letting  his  noble  deeds  speak  for  themselves. 
Unfortunately, the men worthy to judge him are not present.  Thus he laments: 'For I know 
that, while it would only be necessary for me to be silent, nothing would be gained by this  
man by arguing.  But as it is, those who were there during these deeds are absent' (1.2ff). 
(The inference here is that none of the judges belong, as he does, to the class of 'men of  
action').  He further emphasises the worthlessness of arguments versus action at 1.6ff, and 
later adds that 'because of a dearth of action, many and long arguments are argued' (8.2ff). 
He exhorts the jury to only consider deeds and not arguments when deciding over matters 
of 'excellence' (ἀρετή).  'For indeed war is not decided by argument but by action.  It is not 
possible to gainsay the enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved –  in silence' 
(7.2ff).   The  words  put  into  Ajax's  mouth  are  very  much  the  words  that  a  literary 
representation of the noble Ajax required.  In fact, he is very much his noble self and his 
speech is actually characterising him as such.  Clearly this is not an attempt to put forward 
an ideal argument for Ajax's defence, but is rather an attempt to put forward an argument 
for the defence of Ajax's ideals.  Ideals which the speech shows to be beleaguered and rare. 
In an important sense this speech showcases, not rhetoric, but character and values.
Further evidence of this can be found in the fact that Ajax goes on to base his whole case 
on character.  He contrasts his dignified and noble character, taciturn but big on brave deeds, 
with the scurrilous and deceitful character of Odysseus, who is garrulous but cowardly.  He 
specifically states that 'if I  were opposed to a man of similar character (ὁμοιότροπον) to 
myself, being defeated would not matter to me' (5.1).  In reality, however, he claims that their 
characters could not be more different.  'For while there is no exploit he would do openly, I  
would  not  dare  to  do  anything  surreptitiously.   And  whereas  I  could  not  bear  a  bad 
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reputation, nor to be mistreated, he would endure being strung up for flogging if he would 
gain anything by it!' (5.2ff).  He goes on to recount the fact that Odysseus actually did go 
ahead and submit to being flogged, and beaten,  and punched in the face by slaves,  and 
dressed in rags.  And having done so he then robbed a temple (6.1ff).  This rather naturally 
leads  Ajax to incredulously enquire how such a wretch could imagine he deserved to gain 
possession of the arms of Achilles (6.6ff).  By the close of his speech he informs the jurors 
confidently that there is no way such an 'arguing man' could possibly aid them (8.1).
It also seems that not only is Ajax characterised as himself after the model of the staunch 
warrior  depicted  in  epic,  but  also  on  the  model  employed  in  fifth  century  literary 
interpretations that held him up as a bastion of nobility defending 'what is noble' (τὸ καλόν) 
against the rabble rousers and the base mob (οἱ πολλοί).  Throughout his address, as has 
been noted, Ajax treats his judges as though they are entirely beneath him.  He considers 
them to be some sort of democratic jury and utterly incapable of making judgements about 
'excellence'  (ἀρετή) and 'the nobility'  (οἱ  καλοὶ κἀγαθοί).   In one outburst  of  righteous, 
noble  indignation he tells  the jurors  'you who are  ignorant  have undertaken to  judge a 
matter about which you have no clue' (4.3ff).  It is clear that here Antisthenes is likening 
Ajax's judges to a popular democratic jury.  And what Ajax is really implying is: how can a 
jury of the base mob possibly imagine they can judge one of the nobility on the subject of 
excellence?
Ajax  even calls  into  question the  credentials  of  the  kings  by  claiming that  they  have 
shown themselves unworthy of their positions by abdicating their responsibility for judging 
the contest.  He is certain that this is due to their lack of competence for the task: 'I know  
this: that no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more 
than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another' (4.4ff).  In other words, 
they are not competent to judge about excellence because they are not real kings.
In another rather brilliant display of aristocratic contempt for the democratic institution of 
law courts manned by non-aristocratic judges, at one point he snidely suggests to the jurors  
that they should recognise 'that you are seated here not as judges (κριταὶ) over the arguments 
but  merely  as  guessers'  (δοξασταὶ,  8.7f).   Real  judges  –  e.g.  aristocratic  judges  from the 
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Areopagus, appointed from among the wealthy and noble ex-Archons (Arist. Ath. Pol. 3.6; cf. 
Plut. Per. 10.3-4) – would know a good man when they saw one.  This rabble of base men do 
not recognise or perceive what is noble and so can only make guesses based on specious 
arguments crafted with flowery words.  When Ajax closes his speech telling his judges that 
he is 'always stationed first, and alone, without a wall', (9.6) what he is really saying is: I am 
superior to all of you; and I don't need you.
In contrast, the speech of Odysseus generally offers arguments more calculated to win 
over the judges and win the debate.  He creates an identity opposed to Ajax and in alliance 
with the jury by using the first person plural pronoun  ἡμῶν (3.4, 3.7).  In contrast, Ajax 
never uses it inclusively like this.  Odysseus also enhances the perception of alienation (that 
Ajax himself has created) by referring to Ajax as 'you' (σύ) and the jurors as 'the others' (μὲν 
ἄλλοι,  4.5).   He  later  reminds  the  jury  of  Ajax's  threats  against  them:  'you  are  even 
threatening in addition that you will do some harm against these men, if they were to vote 
the arms to me'  (5.5).   Odysseus turns Ajax's repeated insults against  the jury regarding 
ignorance back on him, while at the same time presumably appealing to the judges sense of 
vengeful righteousness, by accusing Ajax of being ignorant and ungrateful (4.6).  He points 
out that Ajax's open struggle was pointless and achieved nothing (6.2), and that it appears 
that he knows nothing about excellence nor even how to fight (6.4f).
In spite of these relatively persuasive arguments, Odysseus still starts out by alienating 
the judges.  In his first breath he more or less tells them: I have achieved more and I am 
worth more than the whole lot of you (1.3), and while you cannot act without me, I can 
without you (1.5).  He adds that their efforts were pointless, even if they had fought bravely 
(which they did not, 2.2).  His efforts, however, were effective (2.4), and in fact the success of 
the entire expedition depended solely on him (3.1).  Whereas the only thing the rest of the 
army can do is pray that Troy might be captured, Odysseus single-handedly discovers how 
to do it (4.1ff).  Meanwhile everyone else toiled away in vain (6.2f).  Odysseus also joins with 
Ajax in declaring to the jurors that: you are all ignorant of my activities on your behalf (1.7),  
implying later for good measure that they are all foolish (6.3).
So although he mounts some well-judged arguments as to why he deserves the arms of 
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Achilles, it is evident that he treats his judges with an aristocratic contempt of a related ilk to  
Ajax's.  Even when Odysseus conspicuously commends the jurors in contrast to Ajax – 'while 
the others are grateful, you go so far as to reproach me' (4.5) – he continues to bear an air of 
superiority toward his less fortunate wards.  Apparently they are only too grateful to have a 
resourceful leader such as him to defend and deliver them.  In reality, Odysseus, like his  
opponent, is of noble stock, but unlike Ajax, he appears to have submitted to employing (if 
not altogether skilfully) the language and strategies necessary to survive in a democratic 
system.  He is, in other words, being characterised as a sort of proto-demagogue.
In summary, neither of the speeches is an effective example of epideictic.  They fail to 
demonstrate proper respect for the judges – in Ajax's case, rather astoundingly.  They also 
fail to deliver compelling arguments, much less ideal ones.  Both speakers display a great 
deal of their own character rather than adopting a persona calculated to win the jurors over 
and  hence  win  the  case.   As  mentioned  though,  it  does  seem  that  Odysseus  is  being 
characterised as somewhat of a demagogue.  As one would expect of such characterisation, 
he is at least reasonably persuasive.  Nevertheless, his aristocratic contempt for the judges 
still shows through at several points.  
If the speeches are not epideictic, this raises the question: what are they?  And what was  
Antisthenes attempting to do with them?  The difficulty of classifying and understanding 
the speeches is made evident by the lack of attention they have received.  The histories and 
handbooks on Greek oratory either make no mention,25 or cursory mention,26 of Antisthenes. 
It appears that none discuss his  Ajax  and  Odysseus.   The speeches have received varying 
levels of attention from a handful of modern authors in other fields, but none really offer 
much depth of discussion or notice features such as the spectacularly self-defeating nature of 
Ajax's approach.  The next chapter will explore these questions further and propose some 
answers to them.
25 e.g. Habinek 2005; Jost 2004; Yunis 1996; Kennedy 1994.
26 e.g. Fox & Livingstone 2007, 133, 544; Usher 1999, 296 n. 2; Johnstone 1996, 34, 37, 100; Poulakis 1995, 183 
n. 7; Schiappa 1994, 131, 140; Easterling 1985, 510; Russell 1983, 16.
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Chapter 2 – Characterisation: Ethopoiia and the Ajax and Odysseus.
Before  commencing  a  specific  discussion  of  Antisthenes  and what  he  was  seeking  to 
demonstrate with his  Ajax  and  Odysseus it will be useful to conduct a brief survey of the 
trends in rhetoric at the turn of the fifth into the fourth century.  Oratory in Athens took on a 
whole new dimension in 427 when Gorgias, as part of an embassy from Leontini in Sicily  
(Th. 3.86.3), 'astounded' (κατεπλήξατο) the Athenian assembly (D.H.  Lys. 3; cf. Pl.  Hp.Ma. 
282b)  and  'amazed'  (ἐξέπληξε) them  with  his  elaborate  use  of  rhetorical  devices  (D.S. 
12.53.3f).   This  heralded  the  onset  of  a  new  wave  of  creative  speech  writing.   Shortly 
thereafter,  in  historical  prose,  Thucydides  too  was  'utilising  poetical  devices'  (ποιητικῇ 
κατασκευῇ χρησάμενος) for the speeches he was writing, while 'frequently imposing a lofty 
tone upon his style, and at the same time embellishing it with rather unusual words'27 (D.H. 
Lys. 3).   He was also  lending the speakers  a degree of  characterisation by their  style  of  
delivery; for example the Spartans are generally depicted as terse and reticent (Francis 1993). 
Then at the close of the fifth century, with a career probably commencing in 403 (Jebb 
1893, i.153), Lysias developed a natural style of rhetoric, which, while retaining considerable 
'force and power' (ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν), nonetheless, 'employed ordinary and regular words' 
(ἐν ὀνόμασι κυρίοις καὶ κοινοῖς, D.H. Lys. 3).  Of particular interest for the investigation in 
hand is the fact that he developed the ability to dramatise character in his speeches (i.156). 
He was known in antiquity as an exponent of the 'plain style' (λέξις λιτή), which employed 
'everyday language' (ἰδιώτης λόγος, D.H. Dem. 2), and as such he provided customers with 
speeches very much in character, so that when delivered they gave the impression of being 
their  own words (Jebb 1893, i.159, 163).   This seemingly natural style of characterisation 
through  use  of  language  was  termed  'ethopoiia'  (ἠθοποιΐα).  One  modern  critic finds 
individual characterisation to be inconsistently used throughout Lysias' speeches, only really 
detecting it in a handful of speeches.28  He sums up his study stating: 'Character-portrayal is 
thus far from being common to all the speeches of Lysias' (Usher 1965, 119).  This estimation 
is at odds, however, with the premier ancient critic, Dionysius, who declares himself 'quite 
incapable of finding one individual' portrayed in the speeches of Lysias – of the 200 known 
27 ἐν πολλοῖς ἐξήλλαξε τὴν ἑρμηνείαν εἰς ὄγκον ἅμα καὶ κόσμον ὀνομάτων ἀηθέστερον.
28 1, 3, 7, 10, 16, 19, 24, 31 & 32; Usher 1965, 101-16.
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to him (Lys. 17) – who is 'lacking character or lifeless' (ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον, Lys. 8).  
There has been very little modern discourse on the use of ethopoiia in literary works, and 
the two specific studies there are in English (only one since 1892) focus squarely on Lysias 
(Devries 1892,  Usher 1965).   Jebb,  in his still  very useful  study of  the Attic  orators,  also 
devotes three pages to discussing ethopoiia as developed and utilised by Lysias (1893, 173-
6).  Devries' work Ethopoiia, a study of character types,  considers only the works of Lysias. 
Among ancient  writers  employing ethopoiia,  Devries  finds  that  Lysias  'excels  all  others' 
(1892, 13).   Interestingly, in the other important study of characterisation,  Usher claims: 
'None of  the  arguments  adduced by  Jebb,  Devries  and  others  in  favour  of  its  meaning 
“individual characterisation” is convincing'.   Rather he thinks it can mean no more than 
'moral  tone'  (1965,  99  n.  2).29  It  appears  that  he  may  have  subsequently  recanted  this 
position,  however,  as  in  a  more  recent  book,  when  discussing  a  case  of  'ethopoiia',  he 
elaborates by describing it  as 'portrayal of the speaker's character'  (1999, 310).   Certainly 
Dionysius seems to think it is something like this.  He attributes Lysias' ability to express 
ethopoiia (ἠθοποιΐα) to his 'excellence'  at manifesting 'thought,  diction, and composition' 
(διάνοια, λέξις, σύνθεσις) in his speeches (D.H.  Lys. 8).  That is to say, the thoughts, the 
choice of words, and the manner in which they are combined reflect the character of the  
person they are written for and who will  deliver  them.   Dionysius  goes on to add that  
'appropriateness'  (τὸ  πρέπον)  was  an  important  adjunct  to  ethopoiia.   This  was  Lysias' 
ability to match appropriate style to the speaker, the audience, and the subject matter.  'For 
the characters differ from each other in age, family background, education, occupation, way 
of life, and in other regards' (Lys. 9).  As 'ethopoiia' is generally used in modern scholarship, 
it probably more accurately refers to 'characterisation' by a combination of what Dionysius 
called 'ethopoiia' and 'appropriateness'.  Carey also notices a difference between Dionysius' 
and modern scholars' use of the term 'ethopoiia'; like Usher, he thinks  Dionysius use of it 
was  limited  to 'moral  tone',  whereas  modern  scholars  mean  Lysias'  'extensive  use  of 
“dramatic” character' (1989, 10).  Clearly in as much as ethopoiia has been considered (which 
is not very much) there remains uncertainty as to its meaning.  It may or may not be 'moral  
29 A position with which Todd agrees (2000, 7).
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tone',  'appropriateness',  'dramatic characterisation'.   This  does show that to modern eyes 
Lysias'  characterisation  seems  bound  by  ethical  and  rhetorical  constraints  that  seem 
somewhat alien to modern literature.  And yet all agree that for the first time in the history of 
Greek prose writing there arose a new concern for  individualising speech,  whether that 
individualisation was primarily inspired by ethical philosophy or by theatre.  
The development of ethology, i.e. attempting to understand the way other people think 
and the values that motivate them on their own terms, is an unusual event in history.  It  
represents a major shift in world view from a more common culturally complacent tendency 
throughout history to take a derogatory stance towards anything 'other'.  Mikhail Bakhtin 
characterised it as a shift from a 'monologic' to a 'dialogic' mode of representation.  Ethopoiia 
then is the  attempt to demonstrate the way an individual of a specific social position, driven 
by certain thoughts and values, would act.  In as much as ethopoiia for speech writing has 
been  considered,  Lysias  is  credited  with  conceiving  it.   In  particular  he  is  known  for 
specialising in the development of  the appropriate characterisation to appeal  to  juries  in 
various sorts of forensic cases.  Antisthenes' name, however, has never been mentioned in 
regard to  ethological  speech  writing.   But  could  what  he  was  doing  also  be  classed  as 
ethopoiia?  
Certainly Antisthenes was interested in character and how it is manifested.  Listed among 
the titles in the second volume of his works is a treatise called: 'Concerning the Sophists: a 
Physiognomy' (Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός).  This is the first recorded instance 
of  physiognomy meeting with a philosophical interpretation in the ancient world (Boys-
Stone  2007,  23).   Tsouna  surmises  that  Antisthenes  treatise  'probably  attacked  the 
physiognomical diagnoses attempted by the sophists', but offers no reasons why she thinks 
so (1998, 181).  By the title, however, it seems reasonably clear that the work was about the 
sophists,  not against them.  The preposition  περί  does not normally have an adversarial 
meaning.  So it is more likely that it was a discussion of the ideas of the sophists concerning 
physiognomy.   Even  more  interesting  for  the  current  discussion  is  Antisthenes'  study 
entitled 'Concerning Style, or, Concerning Characters' (Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων), 
which is recorded as being bound in the same volume of his works as (and immediately 
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ahead of) the  Ajax  and  Odysseus (D.L. 6.15).  These works demonstrate Antisthenes' deep 
interest  in aspects  of style and character ,  how they manifest  themselves,  and how they 
might be represented.
In modern criticism, however,  as noted in the previous chapter,  Antisthenes'  Ajax  and 
Odysseus have on the whole attracted very little scholarly attention.  When they have been 
noticed, despite a considerable divergence of opinion as to their purpose, the notion that 
Antisthenes was demonstrating ethopoiia has usually not been considered.   In the most 
recent of only two English language monographs on  Antisthenes,30 Navia mentions these 
complete fragments of Antisthenes only very briefly twice in the entire volume, one of those 
times being in a footnote (2001, 14 & 51 n.4).31  Although he mentions the texts he offers not 
one word of discussion about what he thinks they are and if they might be important in any  
way.   Indeed  one  of  the  two modern  authors  to  make  explicit  mention  to  ethopoiia  in 
conjunction with Antisthenes' speeches, does so to deny that Antisthenes was using it.32
Moving on to  consider  authors  who have at  least  looked at  the texts  and offered an 
opinion, Sier interprets the speeches as 'two sides of the same coin' representing the central  
ideas of Antisthenes' linguistic philosophy (1996, 80-1).  Most recently Tindale suggested that 
the speeches 'explore important questions of courage and cowardice' (2010, 109).  In a related 
vein, Prince thinks that the protagonists are engaged in a 'debate over the nature of virtue'  
(2006,  82),  later  reiterating  that  it  is  'a  debate  about  virtue  and  the  correct  meaning  of  
“virtue” and related terms from the vantages of opposed moral characters' (83).  She adds 
that the speeches have puzzled scholars and that they are 'not charming in any obvious 
way'! (83).  In a slightly curious conclusion, she finally decides that Odysseus 'represents an 
ideal for just one aspect of the wise man, his role as rhetor, whose function is to direct others 
toward the good rather than to be good himself' (85).  She goes on to argue that 'Odysseus’ 
goal is more to convert Ajax from his rigid, shame-based moral view to virtue, and so save 
him from the  suicide  predetermined in  the  myth,  than to  win the contest  for  the  arms. 
Insofar as he fails to benefit Ajax, Antisthenes’ Odysseus might be a model not for success,  
30 The other being Rankin 1986.
31 It is also a little unfortunate that on both occasions he also refers to the Odysseus as the Ulysses.  
32 See on Eucken below.
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but for a correctly constructed intention to benefit the interlocutor' (85).  It will be argued 
below that Antisthenes' intention was somewhat different.
Evidence of characterisation in the pieces has also been asserted or denied to some extent  
by a handful of authors.  Stanford notices that Ajax's speech is 'arrogant, insensitive, and 
tactless' and that he 'maladroitly implies that he thinks little of his judges, and lectures them 
on their proper attitude and duty' (1968, 97).  Offering a rather cursory interpretation, Hesk 
says that 'Odysseus' speech is longer, funnier and cleverer than the somewhat inept effort of 
Ajax'  (2000,  119).   In  a  discussion  about  fifth  century  style,  Worman gives  Antisthenes 
considerably more credit when she assumes 'that Antisthenes was working with a notion of 
charaktêr associated with verbal style, which likely involved ideas about how different styles 
ought  to  suit  different  character  types',  but  oddly  takes  the  point  of  the  exercise  as  an 
attempt 'to be persuasive' (2002, 33).  In a subsequent more detailed look at the speeches she 
comes closer to the mark in arguing that 'Antisthenes fashions a more abbreviated speech for 
Ajax in his conflict with Odysseus, as befits the angry hero's terse character type' (169).  She 
also notes that Ajax's 'arguments border on a blunt rudeness ... as befits the terse man of 
action'  (185)  and  'his  phrases  tend  to  be  short,  with  frequent  end-stops  and  simple 
vocabulary.  As a good soldier who belongs on the battlefield rather than in the lawcourt'  
(186).  Worman writes that in contrast Antisthenes' 'representation of Odysseus' style better 
befits  the  rhetorically  adept  hero'  (185).   Also  detecting  an  element  of  characterisation, 
Rankin observes: 'There is a dry pawkiness about Antisthenes' characters, especially Aias, 
which may reflect his own personality' (1986, 153).  Similarly observing the author in one of 
his  characters  –  though the  opposite  one  –  Stanford  feels  that  Odysseus  'begins  with  a 
needlessly  unconciliatory  remark,  more  characteristic  of  the  gruff  Antisthenes  than  of 
Homer's hero' (1968, 97).   Most of these authors seem to regard Antisthenes' characters as a 
problem, or a sign of his limitations as a writer – i.e.  he was only capable of presenting 
autobiographical characterisations.  They do not recognise his works as the bold and brilliant 
experiment in ethopoiia that I will argue them to be.
Finally, there are two modern authors who specifically mention ethopoiia in relation to 
the Ajax and Odysseus.  Eucken sees in the speeches 'two fundamentally different attitudes to 
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life, that of the wise man [Odysseus] and that of the fool [Ajax]' (1997, 270).  He sees this as a 
philosophical  battle  evincing  Stoic  virtues  and  goes  on  to  assert  that  the  speeches  are 
distinguished  not  by  their  '”Ethopoiia”,  but  rather  by  their  logical  character'33 (271). 
Contrary to this view, it will be argued here that Kennedy's observations about these works 
are by far the most insightful and accurate.  Although he lists them in his chapter on forensic 
epideictic pieces, he notes that they 'do not appear to be models of structure and argument' 
(1963,  170-1).   He  goes  on  to  provide  a  brief  discussion  of  the  word  he  translates 
'characteristics' (i.e. χαρακτήρων, from Antisthenes Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων).
The word could,  however,  mean any  kind of  characteristics  or  idiosyncrasies. 
Since the two speeches which we have are quite different, primarily because of the 
different way of thought, manner, and moral character of the speakers, it seems 
possible that this is what Antisthenes was trying to illustrate.  Ajax is aristocratic, 
indignant, and resentful.  He scorns the jury and will not stoop to techniques of 
persuasion.  Odysseus is more clever, inventive, ready to claim military ability, 
even self-confident.   We know from Porphyry's  scholia to  the first  line of  the 
Odyssey that Antisthenes was interested in Odysseus' ability to speak and in his 
moral character and that he discussed the meaning of πολύτροπος, the adjective 
used of Odysseus in that line in both senses.  Thus, it is possible that Antisthenes 
is trying to illustrate something like ethopoiia, the manifestation of personality in 
a speech, a subject which was clearly of contemporary interest (172).
The remainder of this chapter will be spent examining Antitheses' Ajax and Odysseus for 
evidence  of  characterisation,  and  arguing  that  ethopoiia  is  very  much  what  he  was 
illustrating.  
As was already demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ajax is characterised quite clearly 
by Antisthenes as an anti-democratic nobleman.  One aspect of Antisthenes' portrayal that 
makes this characterisation evident is  Ajax's concern about 'excellence'  (ἀρετή),  a quality 
traditionally associated with  aristocrats.   Three times he stresses how important it  is  to 
correctly  'discriminate  about  excellence'  (περὶ  ἀρετῆς  κρίνειν,  4.2,  5,  7.2).   As  noted by 
Chantraine and Frisk in their etymological dictionaries (s.v.),  ἀρετή shares its root 'ἀρ-' with 
ἄριστος, 'best', which when used of persons means 'best in birth and rank, noblest' (LSJ s.v.). 
Therefore Ajax implies, quite naturally, that judging about excellence is properly the domain 
of 'kings' (βασιλεῖς, 4.2f & 4.5f).  In contrast to this ideal, it is clear that here Antisthenes is 
33 'Unterschieden sind sie nicht durch Ethopoiie, sondern durch ihren logischen Charakter.'
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instead likening Ajax's judges to a popular democratic jury.  In the fifth century mythical 
tradition it  was the soldiers  who made the judgement over Achilles arms,  e.g.  'Danaans' 
(Δαναοὶ, Pi.  N. 8.27), 'Argives'  (Ἀργείοισιν, S.  Aj. 439), but it was also the Achaean leaders 
who decided in favour of Odysseus.  In Sophocles' version of the tale, Ajax and Teucer place 
especial  blame  on  the  Atreidae,  Agamemnon  and  Menelaus,  for  granting  the  arms  to 
Odysseus (Aj. 445, 1135-7).  The kings were heavily implicated in the epic tradition as well. 
A scholium on the Odyssey relates that Agamemnon consulted Trojan prisoners to find out 
who had harmed them most (Σ Od. 11.547).34  An additional scholium discussing the Little  
Iliad includes another of the kings, Nestor, among those adjudicating (F 2 West).
It  is  very interesting, however,  that this is  not the case here.   Not only is Antisthenes 
introducing a deliberate anachronism and equating the soldiers to democratic jurors,  but 
most intriguing is the fact that the kings are specifically excluded from the audience.  They 
are not involved in the judgment at all.  Ajax himself declares that the kings have 'entrusted 
to  others  the  discrimination  of  excellence'  (4.2,  5).   In  these  circumstances,  Ajax 
characteristically  bridles  at  being compelled to  answer to some sort  of  democratic  court 
procedure controlled by base soldiers.  As discussed in the previous chapter, reflecting the 
low esteem in which Ajax holds the men judging him, and in keeping with his self perceived  
superiority, he constantly gives orders to his judges, insults them, and even threatens them. 
He is confident declaring that his jury, when undertaking to judge 'about excellence',  are 
attempting something about which they have not the slightest clue (4.2ff).  They are directly 
comparable to 'the majority of the mob of men' (ὅμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος) described by 
Pindar in relation to the judgement of the arms, whose 'heart is blind' (τυφλὸν ἔχει ἦτορ)  
and not able 'to see the truth' (ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, N. 7.24ff).  By characterising the judges as 
common soldiers forming a popular jury to consider judgement about the aristocratic Ajax, 
Antisthenes appears to be deliberately framing the speeches as a form of class confrontation.
This contrast of class differences and associated traits is a crucial element exploited by 
Antisthenes' for his development of ethopoiia in the two antagonists.  Ajax himself, when 
discussing his and Odysseus' character (τρόπος)35 says 'nothing could be more different than 
34 Noted by Gantz (1993, 629).
35 Ajax actually introduces the discussion with the compound ὁμοιότροπον ('similar character', 5.1).
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me and him'36 (5.2f).  For example, in accordance with his aristocratic station in life, Ajax is 
characterised explicitly by himself and by Odysseus as being obsessed with his reputation 
and standing in society.  He wishes to gain glory and to avoid shame.  Thus the reason he 
says that he would not dare to do anything underhand is because he could not stand a 'bad 
reputation'  (κακῶς  ἀκούων,  5.3).   Odysseus  mentions  the  delight  Ajax  shows  in  the 
reputation for bravery he has in the eyes of others (7.1f).   Odysseus also admits, that he 
himself  does  not  carry  out  his  deeds  (like  Ajax  does)  'from  a  striving  for  a  glorious 
reputation'  (γλιχόμενος  τοῦ  δοκεῖν,  9.3f),  because  war  does  not  lend  itself  to  'making 
glorious displays' (οὐ δοκεῖν δρᾶν, 9.6f).  Odysseus also suggests that perhaps Ajax is only 
disputing the right to Achilles' arms because he would be ashamed (ἂν αἰσχύνοιο) to admit 
being shown up as cowardly by  just one man (11.6f).  
In contrast Odysseus is not affected by aristocratic shame culture or concerned with his  
standing in the eyes of others.  In fact quite the opposite.  He is shameless and Ajax claims he 
will stoop to any depths to achieve his designs – an allegation Odysseus does not deny.  
According to Ajax, Odysseus did not even want to come on the expedition with the chance 
to gain glory and with the concomitant imperative to avoid shame; Odysseus came 'not 
willingly but unwillingly' (οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ' ἄκων,  9.3).  Odysseus himself is not concerned 
whether specific deeds are noble or shameful as long as the job gets done.  He effectively  
advocates a policy of utilitarianism claiming that 'if it was really noble to capture Ilios, it was 
also noble to discover the means to do it' (4.3f), i.e. whatever means they may be, even if they 
involve deception and temple-robbery (see next paragraph).  He has no particular code of 
conduct or honour and will fight the enemy 'whatever way anyone wants' (ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις 
τρόπον, 9.9).  Glory does not concern him and he would carry out his tasks ´even if no one 
were likely to witness me' (οὐδ' εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαί μέ τινες ἔμελλον, 9.3) or 'if no one were 
watching' (εἰ μηδεὶς ὁρῴη, 9.6).  He even mocks Ajax's delight in having a good reputation 
in the eyes of others as childish (7.1f).
In  order to  produce a  sense  of  outrage at  what  depths  of  depravity  Odysseus might 
plumb with his methods, in one passage Ajax alleges that Odysseus would even submit to 
36 οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει πλέον ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε.
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being 'strung up for flogging' (κρεμάμενος) if he thought it would profit him (5.6).  Then to 
illustrate just  how shameless Odysseus actually is,  he states that not only did he in fact  
'submit to being flogged' but also to 'being beaten with rods on the back and punched with 
fists in the face' – and all of this 'by slaves'! (τοῖς δούλοις, 6.1f).  To top it all off, Odysseus 
then  'dressed  himself  in  rags'  (περιβαλόμενος  ῥάκη,  6.3),  so  that  even  his  external 
appearance was utterly ignoble.  His purpose for enduring such shame and humiliation was 
equally disgraceful, because thus arrayed he went forth and robbed the Trojans' temple (3.2). 
Accordingly,  Ajax  refers  contemptuously  to  Odysseus  as  'this  flogged-man  and temple-
robber'  (ὅδε  ὁ  μαστιγίας  καὶ  ἱερόσυλος,  6.6).   Odysseus  openly  acknowledges  that  he 
carries 'servile weapons' (δουλοπρεπῆ ὅπλα), and wears 'rags' (ῥάκη) and bears 'lash marks' 
(μάστιγας, 10.8f).  He confirms his shameless lack of concern about the opinions of others 
when he says that he would willingly take on whatever guise necessary, 'whether as a slave,  
or a beggar and knave' (εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μαστιγίας, 9.4f).  He freely admits to 
not avoiding any danger just because he thought it might be 'shameful' (αἰσχρὸν, 9.1).
As noted in the previous chapter, Ajax is from the class of the 'men of action', and as a  
result he continuously contrasts the power of action in relation to argument and also extols 
the importance of  conspicuous action that can be  witnessed.   Hence he queries how a just 
judgement could possibly be made 'by arguments' (διὰ λόγων) when the deeds in question 
came about 'via action'  (ἔργῳ, 1.6f).    Consequently,  he orders the jury to only consider 
'actions' (τὰ ἔργα) not 'arguments' (τοὺς λόγους) when they are deciding about 'excellence' 
(ἀρετή), and points out that war also is decided 'by action' (ἔργῳ)  and not 'by argument' 
(λόγῳ,  7.2ff).   He also warns them that they will discover the lack of power ´argument´  
(λόγος) has in relation to ´action´ (ἔργον) if they do not judge well (7.6f).  In keeping with 
his character, Ajax could have tolerated being defeated by one of his true peers, i.e. a man of 
action,  of  'similar  character'  (ὁμοιότροπος)  to  himself  (5.1).   By the  same token he  also 
wishes that he was being tried by men of the same class – men of action who 'were there 
during the venture' (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρῆσαν) and who could thus attest to it first hand 
(1.1f).  This last element, the conspicuity of actions that can be witnessed by others, is also  
critical to Ajax.  He says that he himself 'would not dare to do anything surreptitiously' (5.4). 
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He  observes  that  a  coward  like  Odysseus  would  not  dare  to  use  'conspicuous  arms' 
(ἐπισήμοις ὅπλοις) because they would make his cowardice 'obvious' (ἐκφαίνει, 3.6f).  And 
he also demands that the jury judge 'openly' (φανερῶς) and 'not secretly' (κρύβδην,  8.5). 
Odysseus acknowledges that Ajax battled 'openly' (φανερῶς) (but claims it was pointless, 
6.2).
Directly related to Ajax's focus on conspicuous action is his lack of interest in employing 
words.  Ajax knows that with a perceptive panel of judges of the proper class he would only 
need to remain silent (1.2f).  He further points out that the outcome of war, either victory or 
defeat,  is  decided in silence (7.3ff).   This  emphasis  on silence recalls  the meeting in the  
Odyssey between Odysseus and the shade of Ajax.  Odysseus makes a long speech in favour 
of reconciliation but in response, the ghostly Ajax turns without a word and departs (11.543-
70).  This illustrates a trait that is pervasive in fifth century characterisations of him.  It is 
often the narrator who describes Ajax's nobility and superiority.  For example, we rely on 
Pindar to tell us about Ajax's manly excellence and Odysseus' silver-tongued deceitfulness 
(N.  7.20-30,  8.23-35).  By  contrast,  with  Odysseus,  Pindar  describes  Ajax  as  'tongueless' 
(ἄγλωσσος, P.  N. 8.24).  In this case, however, the silent Ajax gets a speech.  It is a short 
speech – so still in keeping with his character – but it is not silence.  There is no need for a  
narrator here to describe Ajax's characteristics.  Here the ethopoiia shows characterisation by 
itself without a narrator.
Once again, ethopoiia is adduced for Odysseus by just the opposite qualities.  He is not a 
man of conspicuous action, but as Ajax describes him, he is an 'arguing man' (λέγων ἀνήρ, 
8.1).  Bearing out this estimation is the fact that Odysseus' speech is not far shy of being 
twice as long as Ajax's.37  In his next sentence, Ajax notes that it is 'because of a dearth of  
action' (δι' ἀπορίαν ἔργων) that 'many and long arguments are argued' (πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ 
λόγοι λέγονται, 8.2f).  The expression translated here 'long arguments' -  μακροὶ λόγοι – has 
a derogatory connotation in addition to Ajax's obvious contempt for attempting to resolve 
anything using words.  Denyer explains that this expression 'was used in particular for the 
rambling and incoherent rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. IA 313 
37 Also noted by Rankin (1986, 161), and clearly not as Worman claims only 'a third as long again' (2002, 
187).
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'slave that you are, you're telling me  μακροὺς … λόγους'; Arist.  Met. 1091a7-9 'ὁ μακρὸς 
λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing wholesome to say')' (2008, 121, n.329b2). 
In Ajax's view words are only needed by ignorant men.  Ajax states that if the witnesses of 
their actions were testifying, Odysseus would gain nothing 'by arguing' (λέγοντι,  1.3).  He 
muses that Odysseus might actually somehow be persuasive 'when arguing' (λέγων) to the 
court  that  being flogged and beaten by slaves,  and then robbing a temple by night is  a 
'splendid achievement' (καλῶς πέπρακται,  6.1ff).  In addition to his liking for arguments 
and  skill  as  a  word-smith,  Odysseus  is  also  a  man  who  spurns  and  even  despises 
conspicuous action and in fact revels in stealth.  Ajax claims that Odysseus would not carry 
out any exploit openly (φανερῶς, 5.3f), and points out that he operates 'by night' (νύκτωρ, 
3.3,  τῆς νυκτὸς,  6.3).  Odysseus agrees that he takes action 'both by day and by night' (ἐν 
ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ, 9.7) and that he attacked the enemy 'by night' (τῆς νυκτὸς,  10.4).  As 
noted above, Odysseus states that fighting out in the open, as Ajax does, is futile (6.2).
As has been observed, Ajax continuously casts aspersions on Odysseus.  An element of 
this that is often apparent is his tendency to sneer at Odysseus through the use of irony.  For 
instance he mocks Odysseus by sarcastically calling him 'this  brave  man who previously 
robbed the Trojans'  temple'  (3.1f).   He adds that Odysseus had shown off  the statue he 
robbed to the Achaeans 'as if it were some noble deed' (3.3).  He then refers pointedly to 
Odysseus as a 'coward' (δειλός), who would make pains to avoid revealing 'his cowardice' 
(τὴν δειλίαν, 3.6f).  Finally, he rather incredulously questions the notion that a man who has 
been flogged and is a temple robber could somehow imagine he deserves to gain possession 
of the arms of Achilles (6.6f).  
Odysseus in return adopts a patronising tone towards poor Ajax who is sadly out of touch 
with reality.  He turns the tables on Ajax, who has repeatedly labelled the jury as 'ignorant 
men', by saying that it is Ajax who is 'ignorant' (οὐδὲν οἶσθα, 3.6).  He goes further and adds 
that it is 'through stupidity' (ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας) that Ajax suffers being 'ignorant' (οὐδὲν οἶσθα, 
4.6).  Following this theme, Odysseus later queries whether Ajax could actually be 'ignorant'  
(οὐκ  οἶσθ´,  12.1)  that  the  Trojans  did  not  care  about  Achilles'  body,  and if  he  is  really 
'ignorant' (οὐκ οἶσθα, 13.4) that bravery is not the same as being strong.  Odysseus muses at 
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some length about Ajax's 'stupidity' (ἀμαθία,  13.1, 5), and what a great evil it is to suffer 
from such a condition.   However he indulgently,  and rather patronisingly,  refrains from 
reproaching Ajax for 'his stupidity'  (τὴν ἀμαθίαν), saying that, like anyone else suffering 
such a condition, he cannot help it (5.1f).
As a final topic of analysis there are certain elements of verbal style that separate and 
therefore characterise Ajax and Odysseus.  One detail is that Ajax only uses the first person 
plural pronoun once (ἡμῖν,  1.1), and when he does he uses it to exclude the jurors, i.e. he 
means 'those of us who were there', and therefore specifically 'not all of the rest of you'.  He 
also frequently uses the second person imperative to tell his judges what to do.  During a 
string of commands he issues during the closing phase of his speech, he orders the jurors:  
'Look at (ἀθρεῖτε) and consider (σκοπεῖτε) this!' (7.6).  And shortly afterwards commands: 
'Admit  (λέγετε) you  don't  understand  and  adjourn  (ἀνίστασθε)!  Or  judge  (δικάζετε) 
correctly!' (8.3f).  Finally adding: 'Do this (φέρετε) not secretly, but openly!' (8.4f).  Ajax then 
goes on to say 'I forbid you (ἀπαγορεύω) in all areas from making guesses!' (9.2).  The word 
he chooses, ἀπαγορεύειν, is a particularly strong verb of prohibition often used by powerful 
men.  For example Herodotus relates how the tyrant Periander forbade (ἀπηγόρευε) people 
from giving his son refuge (3.51.2). 
As one has now come to expect, Odysseus is characterised by a very different style of 
speaking.  It has already been noted that Odysseus' speech is roughly twice the length of 
Ajax's.  He also creates a sense of solidarity with the judges, and opposition to Ajax, by twice  
using the first person plural pronoun, 'us' (ἡμῶν, 3.4, 7), to include himself and the jury.  He 
also refers  to Ajax as 'you' (σύ) and the jurors as 'the others' (μὲν ἄλλοι,  4.5) to accentuate 
the sense of separation between them that was first created by Ajax himself.  Odysseus never 
uses the second person imperative nor gives the jury any sort of commands or prohibitions.  
So in fact he presents himself as if he were one of the same class of men as the jury, quite 
separate from the isolated, elitist Ajax.  In this Ajax and Odysseus concur.
To summarise, Ajax is characterised in his speech as an old-style aristocrat who refuses to 
yield or even slightly bend to conform with the democratic court made up of base men that  
he  is  confronted  with.   He  is  unabashedly  arrogant  and  threatening,  and  continuously 
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speaks to his judges as if they are completely beneath him.  Clearly he views his inherent 
virtues as beyond their lowly comprehension.  He regularly espouses values consistent with 
his  aristocratic  rank  including  the  importance  of  excellence,  the  value  of  a  glorious 
reputation and the need to avoid shame.  And he has an impulsive urge to reject anyone and 
anything smacking of cowardice.  His use of sarcasm and haughty aristocratic incredulity 
add further  nuance  to  his  character.   His  characterisation is  not  subtle,  but  rather  by  a 
consistently delineated aristocratic outlook it conveys ethopoiia in a convincing manner.  In 
contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called upon to 
defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station.  He is unconcerned about glory  
or  shame and is  purely  focussed on  what  he  needs  to  do  to  expediently  complete  any 
mission he is faced with.  He patronisingly rejects Ajax's old fashioned views and approach 
to battle as stupid and pointless.  Once again, Antisthenes develops Odysseus' ethopoiia by 
his distinct and consistently portrayed values and attitudes.
So  returning  to  the  discussion  that  began  this  chapter,  perhaps  Lysias  did  develop 
ethopoiia for efficacious speeches, but did Antisthenes precede him in thinking about and 
developing ethology for speeches as such?  Certainly he seems to have been the first to write 
counter-productive ethological speeches.  It is also probable that Antisthenes preceded and 
even  inspired  Plato  in  writing  speeches  that  display  character.   Dümmler  has  made  a 
reasonable  case  for  the  Hippias  Minor  being  a  response  to  Antisthenes'  discussion  of 
Odysseus'  polutropos (and a less compelling case for the Homeric passages in the  Ion  and 
Symposium  being  responses  to  Antisthenes:  1882,  29ff).  Certainly,  as  noted  earlier, 
Theopompus thought that several of Plato's works were derived from earlier dialogues of 
Antisthenes (FGrH 115, F 259 = Ath. 11.508c).  Yet among the chapters in a recent collection 
dealing with characterisation in Greek literature, Antisthenes' name does not appear once 
(Pelling 1990).   Even Kennedy, who, as discussed above offered the only methodological 
insights into Antisthenes, did not consider his works significant enough to retain them in his  
latest book – A New History of Classical Rhetoric (1994) contains no references to Antisthenes. 
Despite that, it seems certain that these neglected pieces of Antisthenes'  are demonstration 
speeches but intended to show character portraits rather than an ideal argument.  If so, they 
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are the first examples outside drama and in prose.  As such they represent an important  
moment  in  literary  history  for  the  development  of  oratory,  dialogue  and drama.   They 
demonstrate a deep interest in understanding and representing the way others think and act 
and  therefore  they  are  examples  of  ethopoiia.    Indeed,  when  all  is  said  and  done, 
Antisthenes proves an even better ethopoeticist than Lysias, in so far as his characters are not  
limited by categories of 'appropriateness' or by the populist values and motives required to 
win the sympathy of a democratic jury. 
The place of Antisthenes' characterisations of Ajax and Odysseus in the broader cultural 
and socio-historical context is a topic that will be explored in detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3 – Antisthenes' Ajax and Odysseus: the Literary and Cultural Context
It is clear that Antisthenes' portrayals of Ajax and Odysseus offer a decidedly different 
characterisation from that put forward in the Homeric and general epic tradition.  Authors 
prior to the second quarter of the fifth century always portrayed Odysseus as a resourceful 
epic  hero,  albeit  a  cunning and tricky one,  and Ajax as a noble warrior,  the best  of  the 
Achaeans after Achilles.  Then, starting around 467 (Carey 1981, 133), Pindar put forward an 
interpretation of the heroes in a series of epinician poems that introduced a radically new 
dynamic  between  the  two.38  Focussing  his  characterisation  of  them  on  their  roles  as 
protagonists in the contest for the arms of Achilles, Pindar describes Odysseus as winning 
the contest by virtue of deceitful words, whereas Ajax – portrayed as the nobler and mightier 
man by far – was cruelly cheated of his rightful prize and renown.  This set a trend for the 
characterisation of Odysseus in particular – in tragedy, rhetoric, philosophy and art– for the 
remainder of the fifth and on into the fourth century.  In stark contrast to his earlier heroic 
reputation, after 467 Odysseus came to be uniformly portrayed as a guileful, duplicitous, 
rabble-rousing scoundrel – in short as an anti-hero. 
This crafty, silver-tongued Odysseus, used his deceitful skill with words to prey on any 
one of a number of guileless, old-fashioned noble types.  The victims he brings undone with 
his  verbal  artifice  include  other  Greek  epic  heroes  such  as  Achilles,  Neoptolemus  and 
Philoctetes,  but also non-Greek epic figures including Priam, Hecuba, Hector and even the 
Cyclops.  This chapter will start with a survey of a range of works that feature Odysseus 
preying on his noble victims.  Then, with a continuing focus on these works, it will move on 
to  explore  the  symbolic  dichotomies  that  these words  create  between Odysseus  and his 
noble opponents, such as speech versus action, loquacity versus terseness, expediency versus 
honour, and so on.  Another significant aim of this chapter will be to situate Antisthenes' 
works in this broader literary and cultural context.  That is, to understand to what extent the 
Ajax  and  Odysseus were participating in, and contributing to, this wider discourse.  It will 
then be argued that all the authors, including Antisthenes, were using Odysseus and his 
victims to symbolise opposite parties in a major ethical and social divide that arose with the 
38 Nemean 7 and 8, and Isthmian 4.
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advent of democracy.  In this discourse the division was symbolised on the one hand by 
Odysseus  who  represented  loquacious,  deceitful  demagogues  who  would  say  and  do 
anything to achieve their utilitarian ends, and who exercised great influence over the masses; 
and  on  the  other  by  Ajax  and  other  traditional,  intransigent  aristocrats  with  inherent 
excellence, who spurn talk in favour of noble and glorious deeds. 
In Nemean 7 and 8, Pindar describes Ajax as 'brave-hearted' (7.24) and 'most powerful in 
battle except for Achilles' (8.27).   The arms of Achilles, however, were 'offered up to a shifty 
lie', and Odysseus was awarded them 'by a secret vote' (8.25f).  Pindar puts the blame on 
'hateful persuasion  and guileful  tales' (8.32).  Ajax in comparison is 'tongueless' (7.24).  In 
both these poems and Isthmian 4,  Pindar narrates the gruesome suicide of Ajax that resulted 
(N. 7.25f, 8.27,  I.  4.35f).  Authors of tragedy regularly represent Odysseus corrupting and 
killing noble opponents, and profiting at their expense.  In Sophocles'  Ajax, though Athena 
takes credit for driving Ajax mad (49ff; cf. 450), the chorus knows that it is the 'violently  
persuasive' Odysseus who is destroying Ajax's reputation (150) and 'spreading trumped up 
charges  and  lies'  about  him  (188f).   In  the  same  tragedian's  Philoctetes,  Odysseus  tells 
Neoptolemus 'give yourself to me for a few hours of shamelessness' (83f) and persuades him 
to tell lies 'for profit' and in order 'to trick' Philoctetes (100ff).  Philoctetes himself knows that 
Odysseus 'employs his tongue on every sort of evil argument and every wickedness that can 
help  him achieve  an unjust  goal'  (407ff),  but  he  still  falls  victim to  Odysseus'  'deceitful 
words' and 'cunning mind' (1111f).
Odysseus has a starring or supporting role as the villain in several of Euripides' extant 
plays.  In the  Hecuba, the chorus relate how the 'cunning, gabbling, sweet-talking, rabble-
rouser'  Odysseus persuades the Greeks to make a human sacrifice of Hecuba's daughter 
Polyxena (131ff).  Though Hecuba had spared his life when supplicated, Odysseus admits 
that he just said 'all the words I could find to avoid being killed' (250).  She retorts 'you are  
most thankless who seek demagogue honours' (254f), but still attempts to supplicate him in 
return (271ff).  Odysseus artfully offers to spare her life (which is not being threatened), but 
not Polyxena's (301ff).  In the Iphigenia at Aulis and the Trojan Women, Odysseus is not given a 
speaking part, however, in both he is the menacing demagogue who incites the assembly of 
Greek soldiers to kill more royal children.  In the former tragedy, Agamemnon admits to 
Menelaus that he will  be forced to kill  his daughter,  Iphigenia,  by 'the whole assembled 
Greek army' (514).  He elaborates that it is because Odysseus 'the son of Sisyphus knows 
everything', and he is 'always guileful by nature and accompanied by the mob' (526).  In the 
Trojan Women, Odysseus was 'victorious speaking in the assembly of the Greeks' (721), and 
the victory he won was to persuade them to hurl Hector's infant son, Astyanax, from the 
Trojan battlements (725).  The Cyclops, in the eponymous satyr play is also noble in a simple, 
old-world way.  In it, the satyr Silenus admits to having heard of Odysseus: 'I know of the 
man, the ear-splitting chatterbox, Sisyphus' son' (104).  Odysseus tells Silenus that he does 
not want to use force against  the Cyclops, 'my desire is  for something cunning' (δόλιος, 
447ff).  He goes on to defeat the Cyclops by the method familiar from the Odyssey (9.313-97), 
involving deceitful talk and wine.  The Rhesus, though likely to be a later play, nevertheless 
pits a duplicitous, skulking Odysseus once more against noble and honest prey in Hector 
and Rhesus.
The binary opposition between crafty, ill-intentioned Odysseus and his guileless, noble 
opponents also appears in philosophical and rhetorical texts.   In his  Hippias Minor,  Plato 
features a debate about who is the 'most wily' (πολυτροπώτατον, 364c) and who the 'most 
simple'  (ἁπλούστατος,  364e)  of  Odysseus and Achilles.   Although Hippias and Socrates 
disagree which is which, they do agree that the wily man is 'skilled at deceit'  (366a) and 
superior in 'craftiness and lying' (371d).  An epideictic speech by Gorgias is written on behalf 
of the Greek hero Palamedes who is defending himself against Odysseus' allegations that he 
is a traitor.  Ironically, Odysseus has accused Palamedes of being 'crafty, skilful, resourceful 
and clever'  (DK 82 B11a.25.3-4).   Palamedes,  however,  sets  out to  escape the charges by 
'means of the clearest justice, explaining the truth, and not by deceiving' (33.5-6).
Finally, Pliny records a scene from a famous painting (c.450) by Aristophon, the brother of  
Polygnotus.  He describes it as 'a painting with multiple figures, among which are Priam, 
Helen,  Credulitas,  Odysseus,  Deiphobus,  and  Dolus'39 (35.137f).   The  scene  quite  likely 
figured the people in the foreground and personifications of 'Credulity' and 'Guile' situated 
39 numerosaque tabula, in qua sunt priamus, helena, credulitas, ulixes, deiphobus, dolus.
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above or beside Priam and Odysseus respectively.  This painting recalls a scene in Euripides' 
Hecuba,  where  Hecuba  reminds  Odysseus  how  Helen  brought  him  before  her  and  he 
supplicated her and ultimately deceived her (239-50).  Proclus' summary of the  Little Iliad 
also relates that Helen was by then married to Deiphobus (Arg. 2 West), and also tells us the 
story of Helen's discovery of Odysseus (Arg. 4).  As king of the subsequently defeated Troy, 
Priam is obviously one of the ultimate victims of Odysseus' actions whichever way the scene 
is interpreted.   It is easy to imagine, however, an alternate or expanded version of this story 
that involved him being duped in person by Odysseus.
This consistent negative characterisation of Odysseus set up in opposition to his virtuous 
victims –  all well known Homeric heroes, and all characterized as honest straight-talking, 
old-fashioned aristocrats – spawned a series of ethical antitheses that will now be explored. 
It will readily be noted that many of these categories have been evident in Antisthenes' Ajax  
and Odysseus during discussions in the preceding chapters.
Speech vs. Action
Odysseus has a predilection for using speech over action.  He sums up his own outlook 
perfectly when he tells Neoptolemus: 'when I was young I had a tongue that was inactive 
but an arm that was active; but when I came to put it to the proof I saw that it is the tongue, 
not actions, that rules in all things for mortal men' (S. Ph. 96ff).40  
Noble types, in contrast, detest words being favoured to deeds.  In the same play, when 
the  chorus  start  prematurely  celebrating  the  capture  of  Philoctetes  bow,  Neoptolemus 
reproaches them 'to boast about incomplete deeds is a shameful disgrace!' (842f).  Philoctetes 
himself later tells Neoptolemus that the leaders of the army (i.e. Odysseus) 'are cowardly in 
battle, but bold with words' (1305ff).  Neoptolemus' father,  Achilles, as  Euripides portrays 
him in his Telephus, has much the same outlook.  When he arrives at Troy, Achilles is clearly 
anxious to get fighting and asks Odysseus 'why the delay? You ought not to be lying idle 
here'.  After a brief exchange Odysseus replies: 'It will be soon enough.  One should proceed 
40 Following Kovac's Loeb translation.
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when the time is right'.  An exasperated Achilles retorts: 'You people are always sluggish, 
always delaying, each of you sits and makes a thousand speeches while nothing gets done to 
complete the task (ἔργον).  For my part, as you can see, I have come prepared for action' 
(δρᾶν ἕτοιμος, TrGF F 727c.34-46 Kannicht).41  The same opposition of speech versus action 
is found in rhetoric and philosophy.  Palamedes, in the speech Gorgias gives him, urges his 
jury:  'you  must  not  pay  more  attention  to  arguments  than  deeds'  (DK  82  B11a.34). 
Palamedes also claims that judging would be a simple affair  if  only it  were possible 'by 
means of  arguments' to clearly show 'the truth of deeds' (35).  The implication clearly being 
that the truth of deeds cannot be revealed by arguments.  This very much calls to mind what 
Antisthenes' Ajax said when defending himself against Odysseus (e.g. 1.3ff, 6ff, 7.2ff).
Loquacity vs. Terseness
In literary depictions, Odysseus became renowned for his loquacity.  In a fragment from 
Sophocles the speaker calls Odysseus 'the completely-clever chatterer (κρότημα), the son of 
Laertes!' (TrGF  F 913 Radt).  Elsewhere Hector attributes the same quality, calling him the 
'wiliest  chatterer'  (κρότημ´,  Ε.  Rh.  499).   Odysseus  was  humorously  implicated  in  this 
tendency to chatter by Euripides.  When Odysseus introduces himself, Silenus calls him 'the 
piercing chatterbox' (κρόταλον δριμύ,  104).  Silenus later tells Polyphemus that if he eats 
Odysseus  and  chews  on  his  tongue  he  'will  become ingenious  and  extremely  babbling' 
(λαλίστατος, Cyc. 314f).42  This sort of babbling, chattering quality is what Antisthenes' Ajax 
is referring to when he calls Odysseus an 'arguing man' (8.1) and refers  to the 'many and 
long arguments' (8.2) that he will mount. Pindar discusses babbling and the damaging effect  
it could have on noble reputations:  'praise is confronted by insatiable greed, which is not 
accompanied by justice, but rather by mad men, whose babbling (τὸ λαλαγῆσαι) wants to 
thrust the glorious deeds of noblemen into obscurity' (O. 2.96-8).
By contrast, Odysseus' noble opponents and their peers favour terseness.  Their view is 
concisely  stated by Phaedra  in  Euripides'  tragedy  Hippolytus.   Reacting to  the  long  and 
41 This and other Euripides fragments in this chapter generally follow Collard Cropp's Loeb translations.
42 This and several other valuable ancient references in this chapter noted by Eric Csapo (1994).
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soothing speech of her nurse, Phaedra declares 'this is the very thing that destroys well-
ordered cities and homes of mortal men, overly elegant speech.  You should not speak words 
that are pleasant to the ear, but rather say that from which good reputation (εὐκλεής) arises' 
(489).   Antisthenes  stated  that 'excellence  is  brevity  of  speech'  and  'baseness  is  speech 
without bounds' (SSR 104).  His Ajax was extremely reluctant to speak at all, and when he 
did he offered a speech half the length of Odysseus'.  Preferable even to terseness, however, 
could be silence.  When Neoptolemus sees he has failed to convince Philoctetes to trust him 
he says 'if what I am saying is not fitting, I cease speaking' (E. Ph. 1279f).  In comparison with 
Odysseus, Pindar describes Ajax as 'tongueless' (ἄγλωσσον, N. 8.24).  He writes elsewhere: 
'often being silent is the wisest thing for a man to apprehend' (N. 5.18).  Antisthenes' Ajax 
points out that victory or defeat in battle are both achieved in silence (7.5) and he regretted 
that he was not able to simply remain silent as his defence (1.3).  
Rhetorical Art vs. Plain Talk
The most noteworthy aspect of Odysseus' guile is his rhetorical art.  He is described as 
'exceedingly persuasive' (σφόδρα πείθει, E. Ph. 150).  Speaking in the context of the contest 
for Achilles' arms, Pindar says of Homer: 'his skill deceives with misleading tales'43 (N. 7.20-
3).  This assessment can probably be viewed as being aimed at Odysseus by association. 
Pindar also  writes  that  when Odysseus was favoured over Ajax,  the 'greatest  prize'  (i.e. 
Achilles' armour), 'was offered up to a shifty lie (αἰολῳ ψεύδει,  N. 8.25f).  Again refering 
indirectly to Odysseus, Pindar  tells how Ajax was 'robbed' of the armour of Achilles and 
then adds: 'it seems that hateful persuasion and guileful tales also existed long ago: a fellow 
traveller of treacherous-thoughts and malicious disgrace. She does violence to the illustrious, 
and  upholds  the  rotten  glory  of  the  obscure'44 (N. 8.32ff).  Speaking  of  Odysseus  and 
expressing a very similar sentiment to this last line, the chorus in Sophocles' Ajax claim that 
'when someone takes aim at noble souls he could not miss, but if he were to say such things 
against me he would not be persuasive' (154ff).  Ajax himself calls Odysseus 'the craftiest  
43 σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις.
44 ἐχθρὰ δ᾽ ἄρα πάρφασις ἦν καὶ πάλαι, αἱμύλων μύθων ὁμόφοιτος, δολοφραδής, κακοποιὸν ὄνειδος: 
ἃ τὸ μὲν λαμπρὸν βιᾶται, τῶν δ᾽ ἀφάντων κῦδος ἀντείνει σαθρόν.
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speaker  of  all,  the  hated  trickster'  (αιμυλώτατον,  ἐχθρὸν  ἄλημα,  388).   In  Sophocles' 
Philoctetes,  Odysseus  tells  Neoptolemus  'you  must  beguile  (ἐκκλέψεις)  the  mind  of 
Philoctetes with your words' (54f).  Philoctetes himself knows well that Odysseus 'employs 
his tongue on every sort of evil argument and every wickedness that can help him achieve 
an unjust goal' (407ff).  When Odysseus says he is working on behalf of Zeus, Philoctetes 
exclaims 'hateful creature!  What things you dream up to say!  By hiding behind the gods  
you  make  the  gods  into  liars!'  (987ff).   After  Neoptolemus  has  successfully  executed 
Odysseus plan, Philoctetes admits 'the unsuspected and deceitful words of a treacherous 
mind beguiled me!' (1111f).
Odysseus very often employs his artful speech to persuade and manipulate assemblies 
and crowds.  The chorus leader in Euripides' Hecuba relates that the debate over whether or 
not to make a human sacrifice of Polyxena was 'about even' until Odysseus, the 'cunning, 
gabbling, sweet-talking, rabble-rouser',45 persuaded the army to go through with it (130ff). 
Hecuba herself later accuses Odysseus: 'you are most-thankless (ἀχάριστον) who strive for 
demagogue honours  (δημηγόρους τιμάς) ...  it  is  no concern to you that you harm your 
friends if you can say something pleasing to the mob' (254ff).  In Euripides' Iphigenia at Aulis, 
Agamemnon sees Odysseus as a threat because he is 'always guileful  (ποικίλος) by nature 
and accompanied by the mob' (ὄχλου, 526), and it is implied that he holds sway over the 
'entire  assembled  Greek  army'  (514).   This  is  later  confirmed  when  Achilles  tells 
Clytaemestra that coming to seize Iphigenia are 'countless soldiers, with Odysseus leading 
them' (1363).  In the same author's  Trojan Women, Odysseus is victorious 'speaking in the 
Greek assembly' when persuading them that they should take the infant Astyanax and 'hurl  
him from the Trojan battlements' (721ff).
The aristocratic opponents of Odysseus, however,  prefer plain talk.  In Aeschylus'  The  
Award of the Arms,46 Ajax declares that 'the words of truth are simple' (ἁπλᾶ,  TrGF F 176 
Radt).   The  nobility  even  deliberately  distanced  themselves  from  rhetorical  ability. 
Hippolytus attractively sums up this perspective when he says in remonstrance to his father:  
'though the case you argue has lovely words,  if  one opens it  out  it  is  not lovely.   I  am 
45 ποικιλόφρων κόπις ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστὴς.
46 Ὅπλων Κρίσις.
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unsophisticated (ἄκομψος) at giving speeches to a mob but I am more skilful at addressing 
my peers or nobles.  This also is as fate would have it.  For those who are lowly (φαῦλοι) 
among the wise are accomplished at speaking before the mob'  (παρ´  ὄχλῳ, E. Hip. 984-9). 
An example from historical biography that mirrors this sentiment and is worth mentioning 
is  from  Plutarch.   He  writes  that  Cimon  was  'slanderously'  (διαβάλλοντες)  accused  of 
'flattery of the rabble, and demagoguery'.  Plutarch assures readers, however, that in reality 
these charges were refuted by Cimon's political policies which were actually 'aristocratic and 
Spartan' (Cim. 10.7).
Guile vs. Simpleness
Odysseus had a reputation for guile ever since he was first depicted in epic.  Whereas his 
craftiness was a generally positive attribute beforehand, in the period under consideration it  
became  a  very  negative  one.   Referring  indirectly  to  Odysseus  immediately  before  he 
describes the demise of Ajax, Pindar warns that: 'the craft (τέχνα) of baser men can overtake 
and trip up a more excellent man' (I. 4.33-5).  Ajax calls him 'son of Laertes, filthiest trickster 
of the army' (S. Aj. 381).  In Sophocles' Philoctetes Odysseus says he has a 'scheme' (σόφισμα) 
for  seizing  Philoctetes  (14),  and  tells  Neoptolemus  'this  is  what  we  must  scheme  for' 
(σοφισθῆναι, 77).  Neoptolemus asks Odysseus 'are you not telling me to speak nothing but 
lies?'   Odysseus  replies  'I  am  telling  you  to  take  him  by  a  trick'  (100f;  cf.  102,  107f). 
Neoptolemus later repents that he 'overcame a man with shameful trickery and deceit' (1228; 
cf. 1234).  In a fragment of Sophocles' Those Who Dine Together, Odysseus is addressed as 'you 
who are up to everything' (ὦ πάντα πράσσων), how manifest in you in everything is there 
much of Sisyphus and of your mother's father!'47 (TrGF F 567 Radt).  Odysseus denies to the 
satyr Silenus that he wants to use force against the Cyclops: 'my desire is for something 
cunning' (δόλιος, E. Cyc. 449).  When Hecuba learns that she has been awarded to Odysseus 
she laments that she is 'to be a slave to a vile and treacherous man, an enemy of justice, a  
lawless creature, a man who twists everything from here to there and back again with his 
duplicitous tongue, making enmity where previously there was friendship!' (E. Tr. 277ff).
47 I.e. Autolycus.
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Another aspect of Odysseus' guile was his propensity to operate by stealth and in secret.  
In  Sophocles'  Ajax the  chorus  describes  the  'whispered  words'  (λόγους  ψιθύρους) that 
Odysseus spreads about Ajax (148)  and how he 'spreads secret  rumours'  (187f).   Pindar 
relates  how  justice  was  miscarried  in  the  judgement  of  the  arms  due  to  'the  Danaans 
favouring Odysseus in a secret vote' (κρυφίαισι ἐν ψάφοις, N.8.26f) – Odysseus' influence is 
assumed.  In the  Philoctetes, after Neoptolemus has carried out Odysseus ruse, Philoctetes 
tells  him  'in  your  words  you  were  persuasive  –  deadly  by  stealth'  (λάθρᾳ,  1271f). 
Antisthenes' Ajax similarly spoke of Odysseus' tendency to operate 'by stealth' (λάθρᾳ, 5.3f) 
and by night (3.3, 6.3).  Lies, deceits, disguise and ambush repeatedly characterise the man of 
many wiles in classical literature, as in archaic epic, with the difference being that these are 
now invariably cast in a negative light.
Odysseus'  opponents however,  preferred simpleness,  and a guileless,  straight  forward 
manner and nature.  In Sophocles'  Philoctetes, when Odysseus is outlining his scheme, he 
admits to Neoptolemus 'I know that by nature you are not the sort of man to speak such 
words or to plot to harm others' (79f).  Neoptolemus later confirms 'it is my nature to do 
nothing by treacherous plotting; that is my nature, and it was my father's nature.  But I am 
ready to take the man by force and not by cunning' (88ff).  At one point when Odysseus 
rebukes  him, saying that neither  his  intentions,  nor his  words are 'clever',  Neoptolemus 
responds that 'if they are just, that is better than clever' (1245f).  When Neoptolemus repents 
of his plotting and gives Philoctetes back his bow, Philoctetes says 'you showed the nature of  
the  stock  you  are  sprung  from,  having  not  Sisyphus  but  Achilles  as  a  father'  (1311ff). 
Hippias, in the Hippias Minor, states that Achilles, who is 'the bravest man' to voyage to Troy 
(364c),  is  also 'the most simple'  (ἁπλούστατος,  364e).   Promoting a simple, almost naïve 
approach to life, Sophocles' Ajax declares: 'the happiest life is lived while one understands 
nothing, before one learns delight or pain' (Aj. 554f).   After writing about Ajax and the 
damage that misleading speech can inflict on illustrious men, Pindar pleads with Zeus: 'may 
I stay with the simple mode of life (ἁπλόαις ζωᾶς) so that when I die the reputation (κλέος) 
I pass onto my children is not one of infamy' (τὸ δύσφαμον, N. 8.35ff).  
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Expediency vs. Honour
Rather than striving for traditional forms of martial glory, Odysseus is portrayed in this 
period  as  principally  driven  by  expediency  and  personal  profit.   He  will  say  and  do 
whatever it takes to get the job done.  Antisthenes' Odysseus freely admitted to adopting an 
approach that was expedient.  'If it was a noble undertaking to capture Troy, then it was 
noble to discover the means to do it' (4.3-4).  He is prepared to adapt his methods and fight 
'whatever way anyone wants' (9.9).  And Ajax adds that Odysseus would do anything, even 
undergo a flogging, if he could 'derive any profit' (κερδαίνειν τι) from it (5.6f).  In Sophocles' 
Philoctetes.  Odysseus tells Neoptolemus: 'when you are doing something for profit (κέρδος), 
it is unseemly to hesitate' (111).  Later telling him: 'take whatever is expedient (συμφέροντα) 
from the arguments moment to  moment'  (131).   When he was at  the mercy of  Hecuba,  
Odysseus later admits that when he supplicated her he used 'all the words I could find to 
avoid being killed' (E.  Hec. 250), and had no intention of honouring the promises he made 
(271ff).  Philoctetes says that Odysseus hopes to snare him 'with gentle words' and that 'he 
will say everything and dare everything' to achieve his ends (E. Ph. 633f).  As a result of his 
self-interested outlook Odysseus is not motivated by shame or honour.  In relation to the 
expedition to Troy,  Agamemnon describes Odysseus as 'the one who sailed not willingly' 
(οὐκ ἐκὼν), and who only proved himself a good subordinate 'once yoked'  (A. Ag. 841f). 
Antisthenes' Ajax describes Odysseus' enthusiasm in identical language – he is a man who 
'not willingly' (οὐχ ἑκὼν) but rather 'unwillingly' (ἄκων) came to Troy (9.2f).  In a fragment 
from Euripides' Philoctetes, Odysseus muses: 'how could I be in my right mind, when I could 
be free from troubles and numbered among the army's masses and equally have a share of 
fortune  with  the  cleverest  man?'  (TrGF F  787  Kannicht).   In  the  same  play  he  later 
begrudgingly admits: 'In my reluctance to waste the gratitude for my former exertions, I also  
won't refuse the present labours' (F 789).
Aristocrats, however, inherently possessed excellence (ἀρετή) and understood honour (τὸ 
καλόν).  Pindar writes that 'excellence (ἀρετά) grows among the wise (σοφοῖς) and just 
(δικαίοις) men up to the liquid air, as a tree shoots up fed by fresh dew' (N. 8.40f).  Clearly 
'the wise and just men' here as a synonym for aristocrats.  While Pindar rebuked Homer for 
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exalting Odysseus beyond his dues (N. 7.20ff), he approves of his treatment of Ajax because 
his ἀρετή was upheld: 'he is honoured throughout mankind by Homer, who correctly set out 
all his excellence'  (πᾶσαν ὀρθώσαις ἀρετὰν, N.  8.37-9).  Whereas  Antisthenes'  Odysseus 
avoided  no  risky  undertaking  just  because  it  was  shameful  (9.1),   Philoctetes  tells 
Neoptolemus 'for high-born men, what is shameful is hateful, and what is noble is glorious'  
(E. Ph. 475f).  Nobility was an inherent trait that was immediately recognisable.  The chorus 
in Euripides' Hecuba declare that 'to be born of noble stock (ἐσθλῶν) among mortal men is to 
bear a wondrous and unmistakable stamp (χαρακτὴρ), and more glorious still is the name of 
a high-born  (εὐγενείας) person for those who deserve it (ἀξίοις, 379ff)'.   Hecuba herself 
later declares of her daughter, Polyxena: 'the report of your nobility (γενναῖος) has saved me 
from excessive grief.  Is it not wondrous, that if poor earth gets what is appropriate from the 
gods it produces a good crop, whereas, if it misses out on what it needs, good earth can 
produce a bad crop; but among mankind, the base (πονηρὸς) are always base (κακός), and 
the  noble  (ἐσθλὸς)  are  always  noble  (ἐσθλὸς), never  corrupting  their  nature  even  in 
misfortune, but always remaining good' (591-8).  
In contrast with Odysseus, who will say whatever he needs to in order to avoid death,  
aristocratic concern for renown extended to preferring death to dishonour.  Polyxena does 
not lament the fact that she is about to die – 'for death has come to me as a better fate' (E. 
Hec.  209f).   When  her  mother,  Hecuba,  urges  her  to  throw herself  at  Odysseus'  feet  in 
supplication (336ff), Polyxena states that she wants to die, because if she refuses to die she 
will be proven a base and cowardly woman (347f).  She pleads with her mother: 'desire with 
me that I should die before I meet with a disgrace not fitting for my station' (ἀξίαν, 374f). 
She concludes 'living ignobly is too great a distress' (378).  Even after Neoptolemus had cut 
her throat with his sword, Polyxena 'took great care to fall in seemly fashion to the ground' 
(568f).  The Greeks then scurried about making preparations to honour her, rebuking those 
who were  not  helping with  words  such  as  'Go  and bring some tribute  to  the  woman's 
supreme bravery and surpassing nobility!'  (579f).   In Euripides'  Trojan Women,  when the 
Greeks are coming to seize and kill Astyanax, Talthybius urges Andromache to 'show herself 
as wiser' by 'bearing the pain of misfortune nobly' (εὐγενῶς, 726f).  In the same tragedy 
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Cassandra comforts  Hecuba saying 'it  is  no shameful  garland for  a city to  be destroyed 
nobly,  but  being destroyed ignobly is  inglorious'  (401f).   Hecuba later  urges  her  retinue 
'come, let us rush into the fire!  It is most noble to die together with our father land as it 
burns!' (1282f).  After narrating Ajax's tale, Pindar writes 'yet honour belongs to those whose 
fair tale a god magnifies after they die' (N. 7.32f).  Ajax himself declares 'the high-born man 
must live nobly or be nobly dead' (S. Aj. 479f; cf. 636).  
The  symbolism  of  Odysseus  and  his  noble  victims  expresses  the  anxious,  perhaps 
paranoid, vision of conservative elites in an increasingly divided and increasingly radical 
democratic age. The value system represented by Odysseus is overtly aligned in their minds 
with the most grotesque features ascribed to the demagogues, while Odysseus' opponents 
represent  the  nostalgic  image  of  a  dying  breed  of  pure,  simple,  deeply  principled  but 
intransigent aristocrats.  It will suffice to present just two episodes from the historiography 
of  the period to  show just  how deeply current  events  were filtered through just  such a 
dystopian lens.
A succinct view of the symbolic discourse that has been examined here is well illustrated 
by Plutarch's contemporaneous account of Cimon and Pericles which concerned events of 
the 460s.  This period coincides with Pindar's writing, the lives of the tragedians discussed 
here, Sophocles and Euripides, and also the painter Aristophon.  Cimon was an extremely 
wealthy aristocrat who was favourable to Sparta and less so to the demos (Per. 9.4, Cim. 16.1). 
Plutarch  relates  how as  the  Athenian empire  was growing,  Cimon was admired by  the 
Athenians, and considered the foremost statesman of the Hellenic world (Cim. 16.2-3).  As 
Athenian power waxed, however, and because of Cimon's affection for Sparta and tendency 
to chastise the Athenians for not being like Spartans, he aroused the 'envy'  (φθόνος) and 
'enmity'  (δυσμένειάν) of  his  fellow citizens  (16.3-4).    Pericles  on the other  hand,  as  he 
started his political career, was always confronted by the reputation (δόξαν) and wealth of 
Cimon, so he decided to ingratiate himself with the common people (τὸν δῆμον,  Per. 9.2). 
He 'comprehensively bribed the masses' (συνδεκάσας τὸ πλῆθος) and used them to oppose 
the Council of the Areopagus – the traditional council composed of ex-Archons – of which 
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he was not  a  member (9.3).   Pericles  was 'strongly ensconced with the common people' 
(ἰσχύσας ὁ Περικλῆς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ) and managed to overpower the Areopagus and have 
Cimon ostracised – Cimon, who Plutarch describes as being surpassed by no one in wealth, 
lineage and beneficence toward the city.  Plutarch sums up: 'Such was the power of Pericles 
among the common people'  (τοσοῦτον ἦν τὸ κράτος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τοῦ Περικλέους, 9.4). 
After Cimon's death, Plutarch tells us that no 'brilliant exploit'  (λαμπρὸν) was enacted by 
any  general  against  the  barbarians.   The  Greeks  were  now  under  the  influence  of 
'demagogues'  (δημαγωγῶν) and 'advocates of war against each other' (πολεμοποιῶν ἐπ᾽ 
ἀλλήλους).   This  state  of  affairs  brought  about  an  'unspeakable  destruction'  (φθόρον 
ἀμύθητον) of Greek power (Cim. 19.2).  This case nicely epitomises the aristocratic view of 
the concerns of the two sides involved in the struggle to gain symbolic power that has been 
examined in this chapter.  Old-style aristocrats, who think they are born to rule are worried 
by the new democratic order that idolises the power of speech above inherent excellence and 
brilliant exploits.  Opposed to them are the emergent democrats who are envious and fearful  
of the aristocrats' wealth  and influence and are only too easily swayed by the persuasive 
powers of their demagogue leaders.  
In the final quarter of the fifth century, the political backdrop for this debate was the 
Peloponnesian War between democratic Athens and aristocratic Sparta.  A key turning point 
in the conflict  was dramatised by Thucydides.   It  was a debate between orators held in 
Athens  over  how to  punish  the  Mytileneans  for  revolting  against  the  Athenians.   This 
'Mytilenean Debate' was held between Cleon who was in favour of executing the entire adult 
male population, and Didototus who favoured sparing the men who were members of the 
demos, the common people (Th. 3.42-8).  The exhortations of both orators revolve around 
doing whatever is profitable or expedient for Athens (3.43.1, 44.1, 2, 3, 47.5).  In the end, 
Diodotus won the debate by convincing the Athenians that his course of action was most 
expedient or advantageous for themselves.  Specifically, he suggested that they spare the 
Mytilenean demos, and most importantly, that thereafter they make it a policy in each city  
throughout their empire to favour the demos at the expense of the aristocrats (3.47).  Very 
shortly after this event Thucydides narrates the story of the civil conflict at Corcyra (3.81-3).  
58
He does so because that was where the fruits borne of this new policy were first tasted.  The 
Athenians intervened on the side of the democrats, while the Spartans weighed in on behalf  
of the aristocrats, and the result was an horrific massacre.  
Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at 
such times all happened then – and even worse. For father slew son, men were 
dragged from the temples and slain beside them, and some were even walled up 
in the temple of Dionysus and perished there.  To such excesses of savagery did 
the revolt go, and it seemed all the more savage because it was the first (3.81.5-
82.1).48
The author of a late fifth century political pamphlet  The Old Oligarch, confirms that the 
Athenians always intervene on behalf of the 'worse men' (τοὺς χείρους) in cities torn by civil 
war (Ps.-X. 3.10).  He further notes that the Athenians 'hate the aristocrats'  (μισοῦσι τοὺς 
χρηστούς) and they 'disenfranchise the aristocrats, take away their money, expel and kill 
them, whereas they exalt the base men' (τοὺς πονηροὺς,  1.14).  Thucydides describes how 
the leaders of rival factions in the various cities gave their parties attractive slogans: on the 
one side 'political equality for the masses' (πλήθους ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς); and on the other 
'moderate  aristocracy'  (ἀριστοκρατίας  σώφρονος).   Meanwhile  in  actuality,  both  parties 
'dared the most terrible deeds and sought revenges still more terrible, not pursuing these 
within the bounds of what was just or in the public interest, but only limiting them (both 
parties alike) to the impulse of any given moment' (3.82.8).  
To summarise, by the time Antisthenes was writing his  Ajax  and Odysseus, the frightful 
consequences of the Athenian policy of backing democrats and the Spartan propensity to 
support oligarchs had several times been revealed in a series of brutal civil conflicts.  As 
illustrated by the story of Cimon and Pericles, this struggle had been on going since the 
second quarter  of  the  fifth  century  and thus  formed the  socio-historical  environment  in 
which all the authors discussed in this chapter lived.  The atmosphere was highly charged 
and there was a great deal at stake.  Both parties were struggling to secure ascendency in a 
contest of representations in order to ensure the very preservation of life and livelihood.  In 
this struggle, Odysseus alone very much epitomises the guileful orator with the ability to 
mesmerise and persuade the masses.  As has been seen, he is overwhelmingly portrayed as a  
48 In general following Forster Smith's Loeb translation.
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scheming villain who employs artful deception and stealth to achieve his ends.  These ends 
generally involve personal advantage and profit gained at the expense of a series of noble 
victims.  Suffering by Odysseus' guileful tongue, a range of noble epic characters are used to  
symbolise the noble types he preys upon.  These nobles, who came to symbolise the other 
side  of  the  debate,  include Ajax,  Achilles,  Neoptolemus,  Philoctetes,  Hector,  Priam,  and 
Hecuba.   They are  portrayed as  paragons  of  aristocratic  virtue,  born with  inherent  and 
unmistakable excellence, and so instinctively able to recognise what was noble and good. 
They favour their honour and self-esteem over the favour of the demos, even at the cost of 
their lives, and shun the art of rhetoric that might save them.  If compelled to talk they like to 
keep speech concise and honest.  Rather than living to achieve personal profit or expediency, 
they desire to lead a life that leaves behind an untainted if not glorious reputation.
The next chapter will investigate Antisthenes' personal philosophical views in relation to 
this debate.
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Chapter 4 – Antisthenes' Philosophy of Excellence
Before commencing a discussion of Antisthenes' philosophical views, it is worth carrying 
out a brief survey of modern scholarly opinion of what has been inferred from his portrayal 
of the two protagonists in the  Ajax and  Odysseus.  In order to explain them, some writers 
have  simply  suggested  that  they  are  examples  of  sophistic  rhetoric.   Eucken  sees  them 
presenting views similar to the sophists (1997, 270), and Worman also calls Antisthenes a 
'sophist' (2002, 150), and twice refers to him as 'Gorgias' student' (33 & 169).  She adds that 
the style of the speeches demonstrates the 'technique of sophistic speechwriters' (170).  Sayre 
imagines that they may have been written while Antisthenes was still taking lessons from 
Gorgias  (1948,  237).   As  has  already  been  argued  above,  however,  the  theory  that  the 
speeches are examples of sophistic, epideictic writing is inconsistent with their contents.
Some modern authors think that Antisthenes was promoting a specific agenda related to 
his ethical or moral beliefs.  Thus they see the speeches less as rhetorical pieces and more as 
philosophical, didactic exercises.  Prince writes: 'Scholars have been divided over whether or 
not the dispute has a winner, that is, whether we see just two incompatible views of virtue,  
or whether the eminently more appealing Odysseus is shown to be the better man' (2006, 
83).  In reality, however, opinion does not really seem to be divided.  It appears, in fact, to  
come down uniformly in  favour of  the 'eminently  more  appealing Odysseus'.   Stanford 
describes  Antisthenes  as  a  'supporter'  of  Odysseus  (1968,  96),  later  adding:  'Clearly 
Antisthenes's final intention was to show the much greater merit of Odysseus' (97).  Rankin 
similarly asserts Antisthenes' 'preference for Odysseus' and terms Ajax 'the loser' (1986, 154). 
More  recently,  Worman  declared  that:  'Antisthenes  reveals  his  admiration  of  Odysseus' 
techniques  in  a  more  direct  fashion  than  Gorgias'  (2002,  185).   She  further  discusses 
Antisthenes' 'appreciation of Odysseus' versatility' and claims that he 'strongly countered'  
negative fourth and fifth literary treatments of Odysseus in drama and by Plato (170-1).  In a 
more elaborate discussion, Prince argues that Antisthenes has set out to portray the symbolic 
and moral  superiority  of  Odysseus.   She asserts:  'Just  as  Odysseus used disguise in  the 
Trojan  War  for  a  noble  end  ...  so  securing  victory  for  the  Greeks,  he  uses  language  in 
nonliteral ways to reclaim from Ajax every value and symbolic prize Ajax has staked as his.' 
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She goes on: 'Although Odysseus might seem amoral in his use of cleverness and pursuit of  
victory, his view of self and community sets him above Ajax in a moral sense … Whereas 
Ajax behaves according to the social code, Odysseus appropriates and manipulates social 
categories, especially those of the slave and beggar, to promote the real interests of society' 
(Prince 2006, 84).  So by this rationale, Odysseus is imagined as a champion of the people  
and 'society',  and his morally questionable deeds are justified by their  noble end, i.e.  'to 
promote the real interests of society'.
Attempts have also been made to understand Antisthenes' speeches by interpreting them 
as  pedagogical  tools  for  promoting  his  philosophical  viewpoint.   Antisthenes  preferred 
Odysseus,  Rankin explains,  because of  the fact  that  Odysseus is  'the more philosophical  
hero'  and is  representative of  the 'Protocynic views of  Antisthenes' (1986,  154).   He also 
suggests later that certain passages provide 'a justification of Antisthenes' and subsequently 
the Cynics' views about adoxia' (169).  This, as it turns out, is the most common philosophical 
explanation put forward: that the Odysseus is an embodiment of Antisthenes' alleged Cynic 
views.  As another example,  Stanford claims that Antisthenes portrayed Odysseus much 
more favourably as the depiction was 'from the point of view of a proto-Cynic' (1968, 97). 
Thus  Stanford  goes  on  to  explain  Odysseus'  'readiness  to  serve  the  common  good,  his 
individualism and self-sufficiency, his vigilance and 'gubernatorial' wisdom, his disregard of 
indignities  and  mutilations,'  as  evidence  of  Antisthenes'  'propaganda'  promoting  his 
'conception of  the  good man'  (98).   He further  elaborates  that  Antisthenes,  'like  a  good 
Cynic', represented Odysseus 'suffering in lonely enterprises to serve humanity.'  Ajax, on 
the  other  hand,  'stands  for  those  stereotyped  conventions  and  codes  of  etiquette  which 
inhibit natural virtue' (99).  Prince similarly resorts to a Cynic interpretation to make sense of  
the speeches.   'If  Antisthenes’  Ajax  and  Odysseus  are typical of the kind of persuasion he 
aimed for in his literature, then it seems his messages were  extremely indirect … reading 
Antisthenes well was not like participating in an oral conversation, but required a sort of 
labor. Labor (ponos) and exercise (askēsis) were indeed aspects of his proto-Cynic ethics and 
program for self-improvement' (2006, 83).
So it  is  the  communis opinio that Antisthenes depicted Odysseus more favourably than 
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Ajax.   Some scholars deem Odysseus to be the winner of  debate due to his  mastery of 
language and his superior moral  stance.   Others feel  it  is  because Odysseus represented 
Antisthenes'  Cynic  outlook on community and the 'good man'.   By this  view,  Odysseus 
seems to be favoured by Antisthenes because of  his  utilitarianism.  He sees  what  needs 
doing to benefit the majority of 'society', or even 'humanity', and he is prepared to do what it  
takes to  get  the job done.   Most of  these views seem to have been formed by reference 
primarily or solely to the two speeches and without careful consideration of the other extant 
fragments  of  Antisthenes'  thought.   They  also  seem to  have  been  formed accepting  the 
assumption that Antisthenes was a 'proto-Cynic'.   Fortunately there are around 200 other 
extant  fragments  of  Antisthenes'  thought  which may be  used to  evaluate and test  these 
assumptions. 
Before turning to the fragments themselves,  it  is  worth considering for a moment the 
shaky ground that the whole 'Antisthenes was a proto-Cynic' premise rests on.  There are no 
known anecdotes  referring  to  Antisthenes  or  his  followers  as  'dog'  (κύων)  or  'dog-like' 
(κυνικός) or reporting any Cynic views.49  Aristotle applied the term 'the Dog' (ὁ Κύων) to 
Diogenes of Sinope (Rhet. 3.10.7) but when discussing Antisthenes'  followers he refers to 
them as 'Antistheneans' (Ἀντισθενέιοι,  Met. 1043b).  The fact that a contemporary such as 
Aristotle used the term κύων of Diogenes but did not do so of Antisthenes, and made no 
connection between Diogenes and Antisthenes is telling.
What is more, up until the early second century BC there is not even an extant mention of 
a Cynic school, as such.  Writing in this period, Hippobotus lists nine main philosophical  
schools and Cynicism is not among them (D.L. 1.19).  In the first century BC Cicero does 
discuss Cynicism, but in doing so offers one of the most compelling pieces of evidence for 
rejecting any connection between Cynicism and Antisthenes.  As Sayre has noted (1948, 242), 
Cicero wrote  'we should give no heed to the Cynics' (de Off. 1.128) and 'the Cynics' whole 
system of philosophy must be rejected' (1.148).  Yet he wrote approvingly of Antisthenes' 
49 There is, however, one reference without elaboration that Antisthenes was nicknamed 'Simple Dog' 
(ἁπλοκύων, D.L. 6.13).  Dudley disputes the authenticity of this name because there is not one 'anecdote 
or apophthegm in which Antisthenes figures as a κύων' (1937, 5).  It thus seems far more likely that this 
name was developed by the developers of 'successions' of philosophers (see below).
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writings: 'The Cyrus B impressed me as did the other works of Antisthenes' (ad Att. 12.38). 
So clearly he did not believe that Antisthenes had any relationship to Cynicism.  In addition, 
there is no firm evidence that the tradition that Antisthenes is the first of the Cynics was ever 
postulated prior  to  the  third  century  AD,  when Diogenes  Laertius  in  his  successions  of 
philosophers wrote down Antisthenes  as the founder of  the Cynic  movement (D.L.  6.1). 
Epictetus, a stoic writing at the turn of the second century AD, still discussed Antisthenes in 
conjunction with Plato and Xenophon rather than with the Cynics (Discourses 2.17.36).
Confirming this  notion of  a manufactured 'succession',  in the first  century BC, Cicero 
reported that the Stoics wanted to claim succession from Socrates (Cic. De Oratore, 3.16-8).  It 
appears that they therefore thought of Stoicism as a modified form of Cynicism and claimed 
links  successively  from their  founder Zeno of  Citium to  Crates  of  Thebes,   Diogenes  of 
Sinope,  Antisthenes  and finally Socrates (Sayre 1948,  240).   In  fact,  however,  there is  no 
evidence that there was any sort  of connection between Antisthenes and Diogenes.  The 
evidence we do have actually suggests that Diogenes probably arrived in Athens many years 
after  Antisthenes'  death (Dudley 1937,  2-3).50  None of  the extant  fragments  of  so-called 
'Cynic writers' Crates or Onesicratus makes any mention of Antisthenes, though they do of 
Diogenes (Dudley 1937, 2).  Furthermore, neither the writings of Xenophon nor of Aristotle 
concerning Antisthenes give any hint that he possessed Cynic ideals.  In fact in Xenophon's  
Symposium, far from rejecting all pleasures for an austere ascetic life-style, as did the Cynics, 
Antisthenes describes himself taking  pleasure from eating, drinking and having sex to the 
point of satisfying his requirements for each (4.37-8).
Further repudiating any link between Cynicism and Antisthenes, and at the same time 
serving as a stepping stone towards a fuller discussion of his philosophical ideas, is the issue  
of shame.  Cynics were known as dogs, the word from whence their name derives.   As 
mentioned above,  Aristotle  refers  to  Diogenes  of  Sinope  as  'the  Dog'  (Rhet.  3.10.7),  and 
Cercidas of Megalopolis is found doing likewise (D.L. 6.77).  It seems well noted by Liddell  
50 Höistad attempts to reject Dudley's arguments and establish Antisthenes as the first Cynic after all. 
There are few surviving fragments of Cynic philosophy so he wishes to establish Antisthenes' writings as 
legitimate Cynic texts as they are central to the remainder of his book.  The efforts to do so, however, are 
based on flimsy evidence and are unconvincing (1948, 8-13).
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and  Scott,  that  from  Homeric  times  calling  someone  a  dog  was  a  reproach  'to  denote 
shamelessness or audacity' (s.v., II).  Antisthenes, however, took a dim view of shameful acts. 
He rather simply stated that 'good deeds are noble, base deeds are shameful'51 (D.L. 6.11). 
When he observed that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line: 'What is  
a shameful deed if its doers do not think so?,'52 Antisthenes at once interjected: 'A shameful 
deed is a shameful deed, whether one think so or no' (Plut. Mor. 33c).
Some  of  the  observations  by  modern  scholars  on  the  Ajax  and  Odysseus give  the 
impression that Antisthenes favoured Odysseus because he took actions that benefited 'the 
majority' or 'society'.  There does not seem to be support for this theory from Antisthenes 
own thought, however, and in fact almost the opposite seems to be the case.  To be more 
specific,  Antisthenes  thought  it  was  preferable  to  be  excellent  whether  it  benefited  the 
majority  or  not,  and whether it  met  with approval  of  the majority  or not.   His  view of 
excellence actually smacks very much of the aristocratic outlook that saw a small minority of 
the  population  as  possessing a  natural  and  inherently  large  share  of  excellence.   For 
example, he said: 'It is better to be one of a few noble men fighting against all the base men,  
than with the many base men fighting against a few noble men'53 (D.L. 6.11).   When he 
learned that Plato had been speaking ill of him, he said: 'It is the mark of royalty to act nobly 
and be ill spoken of'54 (D.L. 6.3).  Conversely, when someone said to him 'Many people praise 
you', he said 'What have I done wrong?' (D.L. 6.8).  Thus he cautioned that associating with  
base flatterers was worse than falling in with crows; saying that the latter will devour you 
when dead, but the former while you are still alive (D.L. 6.4). 
Several of the modern authors who have been discussed above mention Odysseus' skill at 
rhetoric  and  argumentation  as  being  a  clear  sign  of  his  superiority  over  Ajax.55  They 
therefore consider that Antisthenes' characterisation of Odysseus as a proto-demagogue is a 
favourable one.  Once again an examination of the fragments of Antisthenes' thought tells  
51 τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά.
52 From the Aeolus of Euripides (TrGF F 17 Kannicht).
53 κρεῖττόν ἐστι μετ´ ὀλίγων ἀγαθῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κακοὺς ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν κακῶν πρὸς ὀλίγους 
ἀγαθοὺς μάχεσθαι.
54 βασιλικόν καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.
55 cf. above, and also especially: Worman 2002, 185-8; Stanford 1968, 96-100; Prince 2006, 84-5.
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another story.  It  is  known from the catalogue in Diogenes Laertius that at least  four of 
Antisthenes' works concerned Odysseus and that others were about Homer and the Odyssey  
(6.17).  This does not mean that he was a supporter of Odysseus, however, as he may have 
been interested in him purely for the trope he represented, i.e. that of an aristocrat with the 
capacity  and  willingness  to  say  and  do  whatever  was  necessary  to  get  his  way  in  a 
democratic system.
Supporting that view are a number of fragments directing condemnation at rhetorical 
prowess.  For example, we learn that in spite of earlier being his student, Antisthenes 'attacks 
the orator Gorgias in his Aspasia' (Ath. 220d = SSR 142).  We are not told on what basis the 
attack was made.   The fact,  however,  that  it  is  specified 'the orator Gorgias'  rather than 
simply 'Gorgias' suggests that it was in his capacity as a rhetorician that Antisthenes was 
censuring him.  It is also reported that his Political Dialogue (Πολιτικὸς Διάλογος), 'contains 
an attack on all the demagogues of Athens' (Ath. 220d = SSR 203).  Further devaluing the 
estimation of rhetoric in Antisthenes' eyes are his anecdotal statements such as: 'excellence is 
brevity of speech, but baseness is speech without bounds'56 (Gnom.  Vat. 743 n. 12 = SSR 104). 
He also said that 'one must stop a person who is arguing in opposition, not by arguing 
against him, but rather by teaching.  For someone would not attempt to cure a madman by 
being mad in return'57 (Stob. II. 2.15 = SSR 174).
Further observations of Antisthenes about rhetoric appear to some scholars to reveal that 
he viewed it in a favourable light, when in fact the opposite is more likely the case.  For 
example, when a father asked Antisthenes what he should teach his son, Antisthenes replied 
'if he is to live among the gods, philosophy, if among humans, rhetoric' (Stob. II 31.76 = SSR 
173).  Prince interprets this by saying: 'the individual, no matter how ethically perfect and 
near to the gods he might be, must still practice the art demanded by his circumstance in a 
community of imperfect – and often downright hostile, stupid, and wicked – companions'  
(2006, 85).  She sees this as Cynic 'rhetoric that enables the virtuous man to live in, and try to 
deliver benefits to, the community' (86). In other words: 'Since you must live among base 
56 τὴν ἀρετήν βραχύλογον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπεραντο λόγον .〈 〉
57 οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον 
ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται.
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humanity,  learn rhetoric'.   Given Antisthenes  other stated views on rhetoric,  however,  it 
seems more reasonable to interpret it as: 'Only learn rhetoric if you are someone who has no 
aspirations above consorting with base humanity.  Otherwise you should learn philosophy.' 
Such  an  understanding  seems  confirmed by  another  fragment  from one  of  Antisthenes' 
Heracles in which Prometheus rebukes Heracles for taking interest in human affairs, adding: 
'You will not be perfect until you learn things higher than human' and 'if you learn a lot  
about human affairs you will err like a brute beast'  (SSR 9658).   So it actually seems that 
Antisthenes was urging people not to conform to the strictures of society or sacrifice their 
pursuit of philosophy in favour of rhetoric.  What he thought the best philosophical values 
were and how they might be embodied is thus the next subject to consider.
Antisthenes  says  in  his  Heracles  that  'the  goal  of  life  is  to  live  in  accordance  with 
excellence'59 (D.L. 6.104 = SSR 98).  Along related lines is his assertion that 'excellence alone is 
sufficient  to  provide  happiness'  (D.L.  6.11  =  SSR  134.3).   Elsewhere  he  declares  that 
'excellence is a weapon that cannot be taken away'60 (D.L. 6.12 = SSR 134.11).  So seemingly 
Antisthenes'  philosophical  outlook  was  driven  by  an  ethical  belief  that  adherence  to 
excellence – ἀρετή – was paramount.  Consequently, it is worth investigating further what 
qualities  he believed constituted excellence and whether either of the protagonists in his 
Ajax  or  Odysseus manifests  such  qualities.   The  first  evidence  to  consider  is  another  of 
Antisthenes'  assertions  regarding  excellence  that  offers  further  evidence  in  favour  of 
rejecting the argument that he recommended acting in accordance with the wishes of the 
'community' or 'society'.  For it is recorded that he was also 'wont to prove' (ἀπεδείκνυε): 
'that the skilled man will conduct public duties, not according to the established laws, but 
rather according to the law of excellence'61 (D.L. 6.11 = SSR 134.7-8).  This is a rather startling 
assertion,  especially  when  read  in  the  face  of  the  prevailing  winds  of  scholarship  that 
consider  Antisthenes'  Ajax  the  inferior  man because  of  his  unwillingness  or  inability  to 
submit to the will of the community and their established laws.
58 = Themist. Περὶ Ἀρετῆς p. 43 R. Mach.
59 τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν.
60 ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον ἡ ἀρετή.
61 καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τὸν κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς.
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Rankin discusses Antisthenes' notion of excellence and the sort of honour he thinks it 
implied.  He concludes that: 'This honour which resided in apparent disregard of honour, 
was to be nourished by the Cynics for several centuries.  Aias, the loser, represents the world 
of Cimon, of Pericles, and Nicias' (1968, 154).  The 'world of Cimon, of Pericles, and Nicias'  
implies an old aristocratic order that, given Ajax's association with it, Rankin obviously feels 
is being superseded from Antisthenes' point of view.  So is there any evidence in Antisthenes 
writings to suggest this?  In fact it appears once again that the opposite is the case.  For a  
start, two of the men mentioned, Cimon and Nicias, displayed clear laconising tendencies, 
and it seems that Antisthenes was more than sympathetic towards Sparta himself.  As for 
Cimon, Plutarch describes him as a 'Sparta-lover' (φιλολάκων, Cim. 16.1; φιλολάκωνα, Per. 
9.4)  and he was ostracised on account  of  this,  and the fact  that  he  was a  'demos-hater'  
(μισόδημον,  Per. 9.4).  He was Sparta's  proxenos,  or special representative, in Athens  (Per. 
29.2),  and regularly  rebuked  the  Athenians  for  not  being  like  Spartans  (Cim. 16.3).   He 
actually named his son Lacedaemonius (Cim. 16.1).  The Athenian general, Nicias, famously 
favoured peace with Sparta and negotiated a settlement with them during the Peloponnesian 
War (Th. 5.16-19).  There are also a number of Antisthenes' fragments that indicate his own 
laconizing tendency.  For example, he said 'As Sparta is the dwelling place of men, Athens is 
the  women's  quarters'  (Theon  Progymn 33  =  SSR 7).   As  noted  above,  he  also  said  that 
'excellence is brevity of speech (βραχύλογον)' (Gnom.  Vat. 743 n. 12 = SSR 104).  Evidently 
βραχύλογος is  synonymous  with  laconic,  and not  surprisingly,  in  Plato's  Laws we  find 
βραχυλογία is a quality attributed to the Spartans (641e).  Having established his general 
favourableness towards Sparta, it is interesting to consider the well demonstrated similarity 
between Antisthenes'  terse and indignant Ajax and the Spartans.  This fact has not gone 
unnoticed by at least  one modern commentator.   Even though he feels  that Odysseus is 
clearly depicted as the winner, Rankin admits that 'Antisthenes has some sympathy for the 
stiff-tongued Laconian simplicity of Aias' (1986, 156).  Prince also recognised that there was 
some  correlation  between  Ajax's  stance  and  Antisthenes'  own  beliefs,  but  seemingly 
understated the case when she wrote: 'Since his words and thoughts resonate with phrases 
and ideas attributed to Antisthenes in other fragments, it is clear that Ajax is meant to be 
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sympathetic on some level' (Prince 2006, 83).  She does not explore the idea further, however,  
and subsequently comments that Ajax's 'extreme adherence to traditional honor usurps any 
sense that he has an inner soul'  (83).   In contrast  she writes that Odysseus 'has the true 
ethical space of choice and agency that could count as a real soul' and that he 'criticizes Ajax’ 
failures in self-knowledge, neglect of the psychic – or perhaps intellectual – components of 
“bravery” and “strength”' (84).  These statements suggests that she is evaluating Ajax against 
different philosophical principles to those that interested Antisthenes.  His preoccupation 
seems to have been very much one that was concerned with living according to excellence. 
There  do  not  appear  to  be  extant  fragments  suggesting  he  had  an  interest  in  the 
development of 'an inner soul'.
Exploring further Antisthenes' attitude towards the old, laconizing aristocracy, his claim 
'that the same people who are high-born are also the excellent ones'62 (D.L. 6.10-11) is rather 
arresting.  The word εὐγενεῖς translated here as 'high-born' is used especially of members of 
the old aristocracy (cf. LSJ s.v.).  In light of this it is interesting to discover that Antisthenes 
himself was described as 'high-born' (γενναῖον) by Socrates (D.L. 2.31).  In keeping with his 
class, Antisthenes appears to have taken a somewhat dim view of democracy.  He observed: 
'It is paradoxical that we extract the weeds from the corn and the unfit soldiers in war but in 
politics we don't dismiss the base men' (τοὺς πονηρούς, D.L. 6.6 = SSR 73).  In the same vein 
he said 'as it is dangerous to give a dagger to a madman, so it is to give power to a base man 
(μοχθηρῷ, SSR 76)'.  What is more, Antisthenes was also renowned for his deeds in war.  He 
distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra in 426, leading Socrates to comment on his 
bravery (D.L. 6.1; for the battle see Thuc. 3.91).  Thus Prince's criticism of Ajax's 'inability to 
adapt  to  his  circumstance,  a  competitive verbal  debate'  (2006,  83)  does  not really reflect 
Antisthenes' own sentiment on the matter.  It seems that the high-born, man of action, Ajax, 
actually  had much in common with the author who so-characterised him.  As a crowning 
argument in support of this interpretation it is instructive to consider Antisthenes' statement,  
'that  excellence  is  a  matter  of  deeds,  and  requires  neither  many  arguments  nor  much 
learning'63 (D.L. 6.11). 
62 τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς [τ]οὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους.
63 τήν τ´ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων.
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It has been established that what underpinned Antisthenes' ethical belief system was the 
importance  of  excellence  and  now  it  has  been  noted  that  what  he  thought  constituted 
excellence was deeds or action.    It  is  thus worth recalling some of  the statements Ajax  
delivers about excellence and deeds in the eponymous speech Antisthenes gives him.  What 
seemingly concerns Ajax more than anything else, and what he delivers tirades about to the 
jury three times, is the importance of properly carrying out 'the discrimination of excellence' 
(περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν, 4.2, 5, 7.2).  Furthermore, Ajax makes arguments regarding deeds or 
actions and their value and importance in comparison to words or arguments no less than 
six times (1.4, 7, 7.3, 4, 7, 8.2).  So evidently the defence that Ajax offers portrays him as 
possessing  an  ethical  position  that  resonates  in  a  direct  and  significant  manner with 
Antisthenes himself. 
This throws new light on Antisthenes' statement, mentioned above, 'that the skilled man 
will conduct public duties, not according to the established laws, but rather according to the 
law of  excellence'  (D.L.  6.11  =  SSR 134.7-8).   Aristotle  discusses  at  some length  men of 
outstanding virtue and the difficulty, or even the injustice, of trying to legislate to control  
them (Pol. 1284a5-17).
But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding excellence, or 
more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the 
excellence of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of 
the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer 
proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated 
unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in excellence 
and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among 
men.  Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with 
persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with 
such men as those described, for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would 
be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in 
the  story  of  Antisthenes  the  lions  said  when  the  hares  made  speeches  in  the 
assembly and demanded that all should have equality.64
Aristotle does not elaborate on what the lions said.  This observation of Antisthenes' must 
have been so well known from his writing or political views that it did not need repeating.  It 
is  possible,  however,  to  adduce  the  lions'  reply  with  a  fair  degree  of  certainty  from an 
64 Generally following Rackham's Loeb translation.
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identical story about the lions and the hares attributed to Aesop.65  In Aesop's fable, after the 
hares finish making their speeches about equality, what the lions actually said was: 'Your 
words, O Hares, are good; but they lack both claws and teeth such as we have' (Aesop 241).  
The attribution of this observation to Antisthenes further confirms the esteem in which he 
held men who were pre-eminent in excellence regardless of any concern they had for the 
community.
At this point it is appropriate to introduce an additional parallel: the case of Antisthenes' 
mentor, Socrates.   It has been established that excellence –  ἀρετή – is paramount among 
Antisthenes' ethical interests and also of critical importance to his character, Ajax.  It seems 
that for Socrates likewise, excellence was the principal concern.  In Plato's Apology, Socrates 
describes himself as talking about excellence every day (38a), urging fellow citizens to strive 
for excellence before any other things (29e, 30b, 31b), and he tells the assembly that after he 
dies he wants them also to urge his sons to strive for excellence above all else (41e).  
As  a  final  and  concluding  argument  in  favour  of  Antisthenes  being  philosophically 
sympathetic towards Ajax as he portrayed him, Ajax's values, and conduct in court generally, 
will  now  be  compared  with  that  of  Socrates.   It  would  be  fascinating  to  know  how 
Antisthenes depicted Socrates in the Socratic dialogues that we know he wrote.  It seems 
probable that he too had written an apology for Socrates.  It is attested that he produced 
Socratic dialogues (D.L. 2.64), however, it is difficult to discern from the list of his works 
which ones they might be.  Works that appear to be candidates for a Socratic dialogue that 
may have been apologetic include: Concerning Justice and Manly Courage: a hortatory work in  
three books;66 Concerning 'the Good';67 Concerning Manly Courage;68 and Concerning 'the Law' or  
Concerning  'the  Noble'  and  'the  Just'.69  (D.L.  6.16  =  SSR 41).   Other  possibilities  include: 
Concerning Dying;70 and Concerning Life and Death71 (D.L.6.17 = SSR 41).  Though it is a pity 
that these writings are now lost, it is fortunate that other works by contemporary authors,  
65 ref. to Aesop noted by Caizzi (1966) comm. ad loc. on F 100.
66 Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος.
67 Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ.
68 Περὶ ἀνδρείας.
69 Περὶ νόμου ἢ περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου.
70 Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.
71 Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.
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namely Plato and Xenophon, preserve portraits – particularly the Apologies – that distinctly 
characterise  Socrates.   Thus  is  it  useful  to  consider  those  characterisations  further  in 
comparison with Antisthenes' characterisation of Ajax to see what insights can be gleaned.
Before turning to the conduct of Ajax and Socrates in court it will be valuable to consider 
one  further  area  of  ethical  concern.   For  Antisthenes,  along  with excellence,  considered 
justice to be of critical value.  He urged people to 'consider a just man to be of greater value 
than a relative' and to 'make men allies who are courageous and at the same time just' (D.L. 
6.11).  In the Symposium, Antisthenes says that justice (δικαιοσύνη) is the most indisputable 
form of nobility (καλοκἀγαθία), because 'manliness and skilfulness (ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφία) 
sometimes seem to be harmful both to friends and to city, but justice does not associate with 
injustice in any manner.' (X. Symp. 3.4).  
Given the demonstrated sympathy between Ajax's  and Antisthenes'  outlooks,  it  is  not 
then surprising to discover that  justice  is also of  concern to Ajax.   He speaks about the 
unlikelihood of achieving justice  (δίκη) from his judges (1.5), as well as the 'justice' those 
judges will receive if they deliver an incorrect verdict (8.6).  He uses the word for 'judge'  
(δικαστής) twice (1.5, 7.2), and the verb 'to judge' (δικάζειν) a remarkable seven times (1.1, 
1.5, 4.3, 7.6, 8.4, 8.6 x2).  In addition, he twice uses another word for 'judge' (κριτής) (7.1, 8.7), 
and the related verb 'to judge' (κρίνω) a further four times (4.3, 4.6, 7.3, 7.4).    In contrast, 
Odysseus does not mention any of the  δικ-root words even once, and only uses the verb 
κρίνω to claim that Ajax has judged him (3.5).  
Interestingly,  when  Socrates  was  defending  himself  in  court,  as  portrayed  in  Plato's 
Apology, he also made a great number of references to justice, judges and judging.  He speaks 
of the importance of being 'just' (δίκαιος), both in regard to himself and others (including the 
judges)  eight times (17c, 18a, 28b, 32c, e, 35c, 41a, 42a).  Among numerous other uses of 
words for judges and judging, he discusses the excellence (ἀρετή) of a judge (δικαστής), i.e. 
'to tell the truth' (18a), and the imperative for a judge to carry out his duties in accordance 
with the laws and not with favours (35c).  He also speaks out about how he refused to do 
anything unjust, either when urged to by the crowd at the time of the trial of the generals  
from the Battle of Arginusae (32c), or when ordered by the tyrants when they wanted him to  
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make an arrest (32d).  
Justice and proper judging then was a theme that was of special interest to Antisthenes, 
belaboured by Ajax, and also considered to be of central importance by Socrates.  There is 
additional evidence to validate this comparison.  In Xenophon's Apology, Socrates states 'I get 
comfort from the case of Palamedes also, who died in similar circumstances to mine.  For  
even now he provides us with far more noble themes for song than does Odysseus, the man 
who unjustly put him to death' (26).  The fact that Socrates compares himself to Palamedes,  
another victim of Odysseus is rather striking.  It is even more notable when it is realised that  
Plato also records Socrates comparing himself to Palamedes,  and to Ajax.  Socrates muses 
about  the  afterlife  and  anticipates  meeting  former  heroes  who  have  died.   He  says:  'I 
personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax,  the son of 
Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgement, and 
compared my life with theirs' (41ab).  So in both authors' accounts, Odysseus is considered 
to have achieved the judgement unjustly.  Obviously the other interesting point here is that 
Socrates compares himself directly with Odysseus' victims, and specifically with Ajax.
Turning now to the defendants' conduct in court, the first thing to note is that Socrates 
seems to share with Ajax some of the 'aristocratic doubt' about the ability of the common 
men to judge 'good men' properly.  He observes how the 'prejudice and dislike of the many' 
(ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος) has already condemned many other 'good men' 
(ἀγαθοὺς  ἄνδρας,  28a).   Also  like  Ajax,  Socrates  is  disparaging  about  the  effects  of 
'persuasive  speaking'  on  his  judges.   In  his  speech,  Ajax  admits  the  fact  that  perhaps 
Odysseus 'will  be persuasive arguing'  (πείσει  λέγων) that his  many shameful  acts  were 
actually  some  kind  of  splendid  accomplishment  (6.5).   With  similar  language,  Socrates 
comments on how persuasively his accusers spoke (οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον,  17a;  πιθανῶς 
λέγοντες, 23e), adding however that not a word they said was true (17a).
Continuing the comparison, Ajax as Antisthenes depicts him is utterly ill at ease with the 
court setting and the obligation to justify himself.  He finds the entire set up to be alien and 
abhorrent.  Socrates is not at home in front of the court either.  He admits that it is the first 
time he has been before the court in his seventy years and hence the way of speaking in court 
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is foreign to him (17de).  Like Ajax, however, he refuses to change his style of speaking to  
suit the court and specifically states that he will not be doing so (17b, 38d).  He also declines  
to beg and beseech the judges with tears while bringing forward his children and relatives 
(34c, 38d).  Ajax also defies his judges and bothers with no apologies for his mode of defence, 
but rather is disdainful about the validity of the entire juridical process.  He queries the 
dubious chances of achieving justice from such 'ignorant judges' and 'by arguments at that'  
(1.6).  As has been noted, he insults his judges by calling them 'ignorant' on no less than three 
other occasions (1.5, 4.3, 7.1).  
It seems that Ajax and Socrates share a similar view also on cowardice.  Ajax states that he 
would never dare to do anything surreptitiously, nor could he bear a cowardly reputation 
(κακῶς ἀκούων,  5.5).  In a related statement, Socrates says that any man of even a little 
merit, before he considers the risk of life or death, should consider whether the things he 
does are the just acts of a good man or the unjust acts of a wicked man.  He then goes on to 
quote Achilles who feared much more to live as a coward (τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν) than to risk 
death and danger while avenging his friends (28bc).   This stance is very reminiscent of the 
general aristocratic disposition, discussed in Chapter 3, of preferring death before dishonour.
On a similar theme, Ajax concluded his speech by telling his audience that that he is  
'always stationed (τέταγμαι) first, and alone, and without walls' (9.5).  This is quite evocative 
of  the  manner  in  which  Socrates  asserts  that  'wherever  a  man  stations  (τάξῃ)  himself, 
thinking it best to be there … there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, 
considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace'  (28d).   He goes on to 
claim that if it was right to remain where his commanders stationed (ἔταττον) him in battle, 
then it would be terrible to desert the position where the god had stationed (ἔταττον) him 
(28e29a).  
Finally, Socrates is utterly self-assured of his value to the Athenians and is quite prepared 
to die for his principals.  To this effect, he tells them that 'no greater good ever came to the 
city than my service to the god' (30a).  If they kill him, he says, they will not be injuring him 
so much as themselves (30c) because they will not easily find another as useful to them as 
himself (30e), if they can ever find one at all (31a).  Furthermore, he states that he does not 
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fear death (29a) and would rather die than yield to fear of doing what is just (32a).  He says 
that even if the jury releases him on this occasion but threatens him with death if he keeps 
up his philosophical pursuits he will  not stop (29cd) and he would refuse  to change his 
conduct even if it meant he is 'to die many times over' (30b).  So while he does not need 
them, and thus is happy to die, they do need him and will sorely miss him if he goes.  When 
Ajax talks about being stationed 'first, and alone', what he similarly seems to be saying is 'I 
am better than all of you – and I don't need you' (9.5).  Xenophon observed that 'Socrates, by 
exalting (μεγαλύνειν) himself before the court, brought ill-will upon himself and made his 
conviction by the jury all the more certain' (Ap. 32).  It seems that Xenophon could just as 
easily have been speaking about Antisthenes' Ajax.
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Conclusion
In antiquity, Antisthenes enjoyed a tremendous reputation as a thinker and as a literary 
stylist.  It has been argued here that in modern scholarship he has generally been completely 
neglected and, when he has been noticed, he has been misunderstood and misrepresented. 
A central aim of this paper has been to redefine his reception in modern scholarship, by  
showing how important he is and how much more attention he deserves.  Ultimately, the 
aim is to re-establish his position as an innovative and influential prose writer of the classical 
period.  
It has been shown that ancient critics from Cicero through Dionysius of Halicarnassus to 
Phrynicus considered Antisthenes to be an important Socratic thinker and a fine Attic stylist.  
He was generally considered to be of similar calibre to writers such as Plato and Xenophon 
and with a literary and philosophical output rivalled by only Aristotle and Democrtius.  In 
modern  scholarship,  by  contrast,  he  is  almost  unknown.   Much  of  the  time  when 
Antisthenes' name has been mentioned, it has been limited to just that – a mention of his 
name.  Many modern works on classical rhetoric and oratory fail to notice him altogether 
and when they do give him consideration him he generally receives a brief  reference in 
passing, e.g. 'Antisthenes, a student of Gorgias.'  His Ajax and Odysseus, have been similarly 
ignored.  They have never been given a complete, continuous translation in any language. 
This almost certainly makes Antisthenes the only important, late fifth century author who is 
not available for study in translation.  
In  so  far  as  his  only  complete  extant  works,  the  Ajax and  Odysseus,  have  received 
attention, they have been considered epideictic display speeches, and poor examples at that. 
The aim of an epideictic speech, particularly a forensic one, is to illustrate a near perfect 
argument  for  a  given  case.   Viewed  from this  perspective,  most  modern  scholars  have 
assessed Antisthenes' efforts as rather clumsy and inept.   This is not at all surprising, as 
when the speeches are subjected to more than a passing glance it is rather obvious that they 
are  not  epideictic.   Rather  than being  persuasive,  the  words  Antisthenes  has  crafted on 
behalf of the heroes in this debate, particularly for Ajax, are counter-productive and self-
defeating.  Ajax, as has been shown, appears altogether out of place in a court setting.  Far 
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from attempting to win over or persuade his judges, instead he routinely insults and even 
threatens them, and he queries their competence for the task they are attempting.  He makes  
a  lot  of  statements  that  seem  more  suited  to  an  indignant  aristocrat  being  insolently 
challenged by those beneath his rank than a sincere litigant eager to sway and convince the 
jury.  The way Ajax presents himself is really quite reminiscent of the way he is presented 
both in epic and in classical literature, i.e. as intransigent, action oriented, and the foremost 
warrior of the Achaeans after Achilles.  In reply Odysseus does put forward a better case, at  
least  in  terms  of  winning  the  argument.   The  manner  in  which  he  relates  to  the  jury,  
however,  is  hardly  more appealing than the attitude of  Ajax.   He also insults  them and 
ensures that they are well aware that he has done more for their mutual cause that the whole 
lot of them put together.  Nevertheless, he is prepared to relate to them on the terms dictated 
by a court setting and the way he addresses them is as if he were some sort of demagogue. 
He is aristocratic like Ajax, but unlike Ajax he is prepared to use his position to influence and 
persuade the common soldiery and people.
It has been argued here that the reason the Ajax and Odysseus are not very persuasive is 
because they are not epideictic pieces.   Some modern scholars have recognised that it  is  
problematic  to  interpret  them  as  ideal  display  speeches  and  have  wondered  what 
Antisthenes was doing with them.  A couple of authors have interpreted the characterisation 
they detect in them as Antisthenes' own personality awkwardly spilling into them.  There 
are a couple of notable exceptions in recent scholarship, however, for example Worman has 
realised that the style of the speeches suits the characters of the speakers to some extent, but 
still concludes that they are intended to be 'persuasive'.  Kennedy, in his The Art of Persuasion  
in Greece, recognised the characterisation evident in the speeches and insightfully suggested 
that they were perhaps intended as exercises in ethopoiia.
The development of ethopoiia represented a bold and innovative attempt to understand 
various people from an ethological point of view – i.e. the values and ethics that motivated 
them  –  and  to  characterise  them  in  speech.   The  development  of  characterisation  and 
ethopoiia in rhetoric has received very little scholarly attention.  In the few modern works 
where it has been discussed Lysias is given all the credit for developing it.  When the Ajax  
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and Odysseus are subjected to a reading with ethopoiia in mind, however, it becomes readily 
apparent that they are actually exceptionally good examples of it.  Ajax is completely driven 
by his ethical concerns and by attitudes that are in keeping with his class, i.e. a born and 
bred aristocrat.  He speaks a great deal about excellence and knows his jury is unfit to judge 
him on that issue.  Reputation and renown are also dear to him.  He is eager to attain glory 
and to  avoid shame and it  is  qualities  such as  these  that  he claims set  him apart  from 
Odysseus.  He has no time for wordy speeches and is only interested in conspicuous action.  
He would actually rather remain silent than be forced to make an argument.  Since he has 
been compelled to defend himself he makes no effort to disguise his aristocratic contempt 
for his judges and actually several times issues orders and commands to them.  By contrast,  
Odysseus is not at all concerned with maintaining reputation or avoiding shame.  He freely 
admits that he will do whatever needs to be done, and in whatever way required, to ensure  
the success of any given mission.  He will even willingly debase himself by being flogged 
and beaten at the hands of slaves if it will advance his cause.  Being at ease with employing  
argument, his speech is characteristically almost twice as long as Ajax's.  The ethopoiia in the 
characterisation of both Ajax and Odysseus is evident at every turn.  
In view of this, it is quite clear that these important works of Antisthenes are a very early 
and hence rather daring and brilliant attempt to illustrate characterisation.  They are in fact  
excellent examples of ethopoiia.  Unlike Lysias' speeches which were all designed purely to 
win legal cases, and as such were very persuasive, these speeches are at times spectacularly 
un-persuasive.  This is because they have no agenda other than delineating the ethopoiia of  
Ajax and Odysseus, and so in a very real sense they are a more serious attempt at pure  
characterisation.   Thus  they  represent  a  critical  moment  in  literary  history  that  has 
implications for the study of character development in rhetoric, dialogue and drama.
Because they have not been recognised as examples of ethopoiia, Antisthenes'  Ajax  and 
Odysseus have  never  been  understood in  their  proper  literary  and cultural  context.   An 
examination of the way in which Odysseus was portrayed throughout the majority of the 
fifth  century  reveals  an  established  tradition  and  discourse  that  Antisthenes  was 
participating  in.   Odysseus  came  to  be  regularly  and  consistently  depicted  as  a  silver-
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tongued anti-hero, whereas previously he had always enjoyed an untarnished reputation as 
a great epic hero.  Routinely opposed to him were a range of noble Homeric heroes whom he 
preyed upon and corrupted or destroyed.  It has been demonstrated that in these symbolic 
representations,  Odysseus'  primary  attributes  were  a  propensity  to  use  guile  and crafty 
words to achieve his utilitarian ends.  His noble victims on the other hand were routinely 
endowed  with  old-style  aristocratic  virtues  –  they  valued  straight  forward  speech  over 
actions, and took pride in their good reputations and honour.  Antisthenes, with his Ajax and 
Odysseus,  was  clearly  participating  in  the  same  discourse,  for  which  the  broader  socio-
historical background was the emergence of democracy and the exacerbated class divisions 
that arose between ascendant democrats and old-style aristocrats during the Peloponnesian 
War.
The  final  and  very  important  case  that  has  been  argued  in  this  paper  relates  to 
Antisthenes'  philosophical  and  ethical  outlook.   A  survey  of  modern  scholarship  has 
revealed that Antisthenes is considered by one and all to be a Cynic or proto-Cynic.  For the 
most  part  it  has  been conjectured that  the speeches  offer  an exploration of  Antisthenes' 
proto-Cynic  philosophical  views.   By  this  rationale,  the  community  minded,  utilitarian 
Odysseus is considered to be closely aligned with Antisthenes' own outlook.  Some authors 
even believe that Odysseus is trying help or educate the poor Ajax, who does not really have 
a proper soul.  It has been clearly demonstrated here, however, that Antisthenes was not a 
Cynic  at  all  and nor  did  he have any Cynic  views.   When his  attitudes  are  considered 
without peering through the rather foggy lens of 'proto-Cynicism' it becomes clear that he is 
preoccupied with ethical concerns, and in particular with excellence –  ἀρετή.   Very much 
after the fashion of his own Ajax, Antisthenes was of noble birth and breeding.  The extant 
fragments of his work reveal an adeptness for martial glory, a tendency to laconize, and a  
lowly estimate of the demos that are all in keeping with his class.  An analysis of the Ajax  
and his other fragments reveal that Antisthenes is sympathetic to Ajax's characterisation in 
every way.  The final and clinching evidence for this assessment is the significant parallels  
that have been illustrated between Antisthenes' portrayal of Ajax and Plato's portrayal of 
Socrates when he was on trial.  Both are uneasy in court and strident in their attitude – they 
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refuse to make any concessions to their judges.  They are both obsessed with justice and 
proper judging, especially in relation to  ἀρετή.  Finally, they are both also convinced that 
their judges sorely underestimate their worth.
In  conclusion,  this  study has  significantly  reinterpreted Antisthenes,  a  critical  ancient 
author who has suffered unfitting neglect.  In particular an examination and discussion of 
his Ajax and Odysseus has proved that they are an original and quite outstanding exercise in 
ethopoiia.  Antisthenes has also been rescued from the position he was erroneously installed 
in as the founder of Cynicism.  His true philosophical values have been identified and have 
been shown to focus on ethical concerns similar to those of his Ajax.  This work may help to 
shape  future  studies  on  Antisthenes  and  his  role  as  a  philosopher  and  literary 
experimentalist.   Much work  remains  to  be  done,  not  least  of  which  would  be  a  fuller  
introductory study of  Antisthenes  that took into account  the findings of  this  paper.   An 
English addition of the fragments with a translation and commentary is another obvious gap 
in  scholarship  that  needs  filling.   Other  works  that  can  be  envisaged  that  would  be 
influenced by this paper include a study of character development that takes Antisthenes 
into consideration, and a study of his real relationship to Socrates and the other Socratic 
philosophers that does likewise.  All these would be proper steps to take in restoring the 
rightful reputation to Antisthenes – that of an intellectual yet innovative and skilful writer 
who  was  considered  one  of  the  foremost  exponents  of  Attic  literary  style  throughout 
antiquity.
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